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ABSTRACT 
After the September 11 attacks on the United States, Albania, a majority-Muslim country 
in a region vulnerable to 21st-century threats—and at the time, a candidate NATO 
member—aligned immediately and publically with the North Atlantic Alliance to fight 
international terrorism. This decision reflected a process of political and institutional 
transformation in Albania that has important implications for both Albania, as a new 
NATO member, and the alliance, as it faces the counterterrorism challenges of the 
coming years. 
This thesis examines the effects of NATO policy and practice, throughout the 
accession process in the years 1994 until 2009 and later, in shaping and guiding Albanian 
counterterrorism efforts. The present project argues that this relationship has positive 
implications for Albania in the dimensions of international security, defense and military 
affairs, as well as domestic security. It suggests that in the future, Albania will continue 
to be a committed member of the Alliance, ready to play its role in fostering and 
extending cooperation with partner countries in the fight against international terrorism. 
The thesis concludes that the Albanian-NATO partnership in the fight against 
international terrorism also underscores for NATO the importance of developing 
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 MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION A.
The September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States affirmed the emergence of 
international terrorism as a serious threat to global security in the 21st century. Such 
blows clearly demonstrated the risk that large-scale terrorist attacks pose to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its members. NATO’s invocation of Article V, 
for the first time in its history, and its subsequent counterterrorism efforts prove that 
fighting terrorism is an important issue on the alliance’s agenda.1  
Albania, a majority-Muslim country in a region “exposed to globalization 
threats,”2 and at the time a candidate NATO member, aligned immediately with the 
United States and the North Atlantic Alliance to fight international terrorism. This 
decision reflected a process of political and institutional transformation in Albania that 
continues to this day—and that has important implications for both Albania, as a new 
NATO member, and the alliance as it faces the counterterrorism challenges of the coming 
years.  
This thesis intends to explore the effects of NATO policy and practice, throughout 
the accession process in the years 1994 until 2009 and later, in shaping and guiding 
Albanian counterterrorism efforts. The present project attempts to shed light on such 
questions as: What are the implications of NATO’s response to terrorism for Albania in 
the dimensions of international security, defense and military affairs, as well as domestic 
security? What are the implications for the armed forces? How might the future of 
Albania’s counterterrorism partnership with and in NATO unfold? What lessons can 
NATO draw from NATO-Albanian relations to improve partnership with other countries 
in the fight against terrorism? All of these questions derive from or at least relate to the 
main topic under consideration here, namely: how NATO, as an institution, as a process 
                                                 
1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO’s Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism,” 
(n.d.), http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm. 
2 Teodora Popescu, “Tackling Terrorism in the Balkans,” (n.d.), 
http://dc97.4shared.com/doc/3mtD7ccU/preview.html. 
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of policy and strategy, and an ideal in political culture, influences the Albanian 
counterterrorism response and, by further implication, Albanian strategic culture in the 
midst of change. 
 IMPORTANCE  B.
The transnational nature of international terrorism, the extremist religious context, 
the ability of terrorist organizations to continuously adapt and develop,3 and the potential 
for great harm necessitates a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, especially for 
smaller states close to the cultural and geographic boundaries that may become 
flashpoints of terroristic activity (either attacks or support for distant groupings). In order 
to be successful, national counterterrorist efforts require intensive international 
cooperation with a variety of security organizations. Albania, especially as the country 
endeavors to embed itself in Western norms and institutions, is committed to be an active 
player in the regional and international cooperation against terrorism. As Richard Nelson 
argues: “NATO, [particularly], as a regional security organization [that] fits in between 
the broadest-scope efforts orchestrated by the UN and more specific national efforts to 
confront terrorism”4 and has a special place in facilitating counterterrorism efforts. 
Furthermore, NATO “through political consultation and a range of practical measures,”5 
provides a promising framework of cooperation for Albania in the fight against terrorism. 
Studying the influence that NATO has had in defining Albania’s counterterrorism 
efforts is very instructive, because the NATO-Albania relationship has undergone 
different stages of development since 1992, when Albania joined the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council (NACC) as the first step in Euro-Atlantic integration.  Albania 
entered Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994 and embarked on a course of increased 
cooperation and contact with NATO norms and practices that culminated in NATO 
                                                 
3 Bruce Hoffman,“Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” in Countering the New Terrorism, ed. Ian O. 
Lesser et al. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1999), 7–37. 
4 C. Richard Nelson, “NATO’s Role in Confronting International Terrorism,” Atlantic Council of 
United States Policy Paper (June 2004), http://www.goodharbor.net/media/images/books/pdf-NATO-role-
confronting-terrorism.pdf. 
5 NATO, “The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism,” (n.d.) http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-
AE854E09-A88AFF64/natolive/topics_50084.htm . 
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membership for Albania in 2009. During this period of time, Albania experienced its own 
close calls with transnational terrorism, particularly as a locus for money laundering and 
other organizational support for Islamic terrorism; it underwent profound democratic 
reforms and sweeping changes to its defense institutions and the armed forces in order to 
prepare the country to face the new emerging threats.  
Ultimately, in support of NATO and especially the alliance’s increasing 
counterterrorism goals, Albania took active part in international efforts against terrorism, 
including the deployment of troops in Afghanistan within the NATO International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) campaign. Significantly, throughout these 
developments, popular support for NATO membership has remained high in Albania, 
hovering at more than 95 percent even today.6 This number demonstrates a unity of 
opinion in Albania that is unusual among new or even established alliance members.  
This support, in turn, suggests that Albanians at both the elite and popular levels of 
society believe that NATO’s response to terrorism is very important to regional and 
global security in the wake of newly emerging threats.7 That is, Albanians, by and large, 
conceive of their national security, particularly counterterrorism measures, in connection 
with NATO—either directly, as an organization in which Albania participates, or 
indirectly, as a matter of implementing NATO’s procedures and values. 
This research question is important because it analyzes NATO’s role in the 
counterterrorism efforts of a partner and a member country, a key strategic consideration 
today, as well as a good indicator of the state of integration and cooperation within the 
alliance, especially its newer members. The impact that NATO’s counterterrorism 
                                                 
6 NATO, “NATO Relations with Albania,” (n.d.) 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48891.htm. 
7 To be sure, Albania also participates in the Central European Initiative (CEI), the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative  (AII), the Southeast Europe Cooperation 
Process (SEECP) and the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), all regional-cooperation organizations that 
focus, at least in part, on transnational crime in and through the Balkans. Albania also aspires to 
membership in the European Union (EU), which entails its own security and counterterrorism measures. 
Acknowledging that all the above organizations play complementary roles and help improve the security of 
Albania, this thesis focuses on NATO because it is the major security organization. NATO-Albania 
relations in the fight against terrorism involved both political and military implications for Albania. NATO 
membership, being the major foreign policy objective for Albania since early 1990, became the primary 
force driving Albania’s efforts to improve the domestic and regional security and to increase regional 
cooperation.      
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strategy has had on the transformation of the Albanian armed forces also provides an 
interesting case study of this process of transforming a nation’s strategic culture through 
consequent and consistent institutional association.   
A closer look at the bases of the widespread elite and popular support for NATO 
in Albania also reveals some insights and implications for future counterterrorism efforts. 
The Euro-Atlantic identity that Albanians embraced after the Cold War makes it difficult 
for Islamic extremism to spread and gain popular support in the country, which further 
contributes to the region’s security. Furthermore, Albania, with a Muslim majority and 
taking active part in the global fight against terrorism, emphasizes the justice of the cause 
and shows that, for example, NATO’s operations in Afghanistan do not amount to a war 
on  a major world religion but rather a war on terrorism in a small band of mass 
murderers and criminals. This stance may encourage other Muslim countries to reject 
extremism and trust NATO—and the West. Of course, an increase of casualties among 
Albanian troops participating in counterterrorism operations and the collateral damage 
that may happen in areas of operation with Muslim populations may influence Albanian 
popular support for such measures and have a backlash effect on the alliance. While 
clearly not exhausting the topic, this thesis will touch on several factors that may enhance 
or limit the role of Albania—a majority-Muslim country with a firm Western 
orientation—in NATO counterterrorism measures. At the heart of these issues is 
Albanian strategic culture and its transformation in the course of its association with 
NATO, especially as regards the current and urgent concerns of counterterrorism. 
 PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES C.
This thesis is guided by the hypotheses that NATO’s response to terrorism has 
had an important impact for Albania in three ways. First, NATO’s operations and 
presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia was received in Albania as 
helping Muslim populations and thus increased even more the strong identification of the 
people with liberal-democratic values that the alliance represents. This embrace of 
NATO’s values, as noted, has made it difficult for religious extremists to spread their 
ideology and conduct terrorist activities in Albania.  
 5 
Second, the continuous political and public support for NATO membership 
induced policymakers to show solidarity with the alliance and participate in NATO 
operations abroad,8 while at the same time taking strict domestic measures. As noted 
above, Albania contributed troops to support Allied forces in the ISAF in Afghanistan—
currently, Albanian troops serve in two ISAF companies in Herat, a platoon in Kabul for 
security operations and escorts, and a special company in combat operation in Kandahar.9 
Since 2008, the Albanian Navy has participated in Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s 
ongoing presence in the Mediterranean.10 In addition, aspiring membership in NATO and 
EU, Albania has achieved significant progress in implementing reforms in the political, 
economic, military, and juridical realms, as well as in combating corruption, organized 
crime, trafficking, and terrorism.11 In addition, Albania undertook strict measures to 
tackle terrorist financing and support activities inside the country by adopting 
counterterrorism legislation and developing interagency action plans.  
Finally, a NATO report indicates that “during the period leading up to accession, 
NATO had been involving Albania in Alliance activities to the greatest extent possible 
and continued to provide support and assistance, including through the Membership 
Action Plan.”12 Albania participated in the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, 
“sharing intelligence and analysis with NATO, enhancing national counter-terrorist 
capabilities and improving border security.”13 Furthermore the Albanian Armed Forces 
were reformed following NATO’s recommendations through the Planning and 
Reviewing Process in order to achieve interoperability with NATO forces and to face 
                                                 
8 NATO, “NATO Relations with Albania,” (n.d.) 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48891.htm. 




11Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania, “Albania and Map,” (n.d) 
http://www.mfa.gov.al/index.php?option=com_multicategories&view=article&id=5735%3Ashqiperia-dhe-
map&Itemid=65&lang=en (accessed May 7, 2011). 
12 NATO, “NATO-Albania Relationship,” (n.d.) http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48891.htm 
(accessed May 10, 2011). 
13 Ibid. 
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more effectively the new threats. These reforms have reverberated through Albania’s 
defense institutions, magnifying the effects and entrenching them in the very fabric of the 
nation’s strategic culture. 
In sum, NATO-Albanian relations in the counterterrorism realm suggest NATO’s 
ability to promote constructive cooperation and to wage “the war of ideas,” which are 
two important fronts in the war on terror.14 Thus, NATO membership has effected 
meaningful changes in Albania’s national counterterrorism policy and practices which 
this study hopes to interpret in detail.  
 LITERATURE REVIEW D.
The literature addresses NATO-Albanian relations in the fight against terrorism as 
part of the broader assessment of NATO enlargement, strategic gains and NATO 
membership efforts of Albania. The literature, while noting the Albanian support to 
NATO’s fight against terrorism, the contribution of Albania in NATO operations, and 
Albanian efforts to tackle domestic terrorism, does not provide in depth analysis of the 
evolution of this relation. There is a gap in the literature in addressing in detail the 
dynamics of NATO-Albania relations in the fight against terrorism. I will fill this gap by 
looking at NATO-Albanian relations, focusing on the fight against terrorism.  
The literature reviewed also reveals the need for a comprehensive approach to 
international terrorism. While there is agreement about the need to improve international 
cooperation to address twenty-first century security threats, especially the threat of 
terrorism, there are different views on what NATO can really do in the fight against 
terrorism. However, the literature shows that NATO partnership programs and initiatives 
may play an important role in fostering cooperation and improving security. Studies of 
some partner countries and new members show NATO’s role in reforming the Albanian 
military has been effective and positive, but there is a need to address specifically the role 
of NATO in shaping their counterterrorist efforts. As the U.S. Congressional Research 
Service noted in 2005: 
                                                 14 Daniel Byman, The Five Front War (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2008), 173-190. 
 7 
In the longer term, efforts to stabilize the region and thereby perhaps 
reduce its attractiveness to terrorists are also dependent upon integrating it 
into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Euro-Atlantic integration for the region 
may encourage these countries to take steps that will enable them to more 
effectively fight terrorism.15  
Hendrickson et al., assessed Albania’s efforts—while “campaigning aggressively” 
for NATO membership, in terms of “modernization of the armed forces, the status of its 
military capabilities, and its steps to combat global terrorism”—and found that NATO 
has been “an important catalyst” for achieving progress in these fields.16  Hans van den 
Berg explains, “On the road towards NATO membership, Albania has made significant 
and tangible steps in implementing reforms in the political, economic, military and 
juridical areas, as well as in combating corruption, organized crime, illegal trafficking 
and terrorism.”17 Indeed, Albania took strict measures against terrorism because while 
aspiring for NATO membership “it [could] not afford to be accused of being a safe haven 
for terrorists or of not doing enough to prevent terrorism.”18 A later study, conducted 
when Albania became a member, suggests that Albania has made considerable efforts to 
“transform itself in a security producer” by making “measurable military advancements” 
and bringing “meaningful geo-strategic advantages to the Alliance.”19 Asymmetric 
threats, like terrorism, with which NATO deals today, require changes in the strategies 
and capabilities of NATO members. Albania changed its military strategy to reflect the 
new threats and plans to develop “niche capabilities” accordingly in the modernization 
plan of 2007–2012.20 The Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER) 2010 
                                                 
15 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Intelligence Issues for Congress, by 
Richard A. Best Jr., CRS Report RL33539 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and 
Publishing, June 1, 2010).      
16 Ryan C. Hendrickson et al., “Albania and NATO’s ‘Open Door’ Policy: Alliance Enlargement and 
Military Transformation,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 19:2 (2006): 243.  
17 Hans A. van den Berg, “Albania into NATO: Once Building Bunkers, Now Building Bridges,” 
Atlantisch Perspectief, no. 3 (2009) http://www.atlcom.nl/site/Publicaties/wp-
content/AP%202009%20nr.%203.pdf. 
18 Damian Gjiknuri, “Albania’s Counter Terrorism-Terrorism Policy Options: Finding a Strategy of 
Common Sense” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 1. 
19 Hendrickson et.al. “Albania and NATO’s ‘Open Door’ Policy” 243. 
20 Mariola Qesaraku, ed., “Costs and Benefits of NATO Membership: Albanian and Regional 
Challenges after the Bucharest Summit,” Institute for Democracy and Mediation, 
http://idmalbania.org/publications/en/NATO-IDM-anglisht.pdf. 
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report on Albanian counter-terrorist capacity notes that Partnership Action Plan against 
Terrorism launched by NATO and partners in 2002 “improved intelligence-sharing and 
cooperation in areas such as border security, terrorism-related training and exercises, and 
the development of capabilities for defense against terrorist attack or for dealing with the 
consequences of such an attack.”21 In sum, the literature shows that NATO brought about 
or encouraged positive changes in Albanian political-military institutions.  
The end of the Cold War was accompanied by fundamental changes in the global 
security environment. As Alexandra Gheciu observes, “While conventional dangers were 
declining there was a corresponding increase in the probability of a different, 
multifaceted and hard to contain type of risk.”22 In its 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO 
had already identified terrorism as a threat to the alliance, but after the September 11 
attacks, the fight against terrorism became, in the words of Lord Robertson, NATO’s 
secretary general at the time, “front and center—a main focus of our activities.”23 As 
NATO’s missions expanded to include counterterrorist tasks, the extent, the 
effectiveness, and even the efficacy of NATO’s contribution to the war on terror has 
become the center of ongoing debates. The literature about the role that NATO may play 
in combating international terrorism reflects this controversy.   
Some scholars doubt whether NATO is an appropriate institution for 
counterterrorism efforts. For example, trying to define the fronts of war on terrorism, 
counterterrorism expert Byman suggests that alliances might be unsuccessful in the war 
against terrorism. He advances the idea that counterterrorism efforts are more productive 
when accomplished in “bilateral settings,” rather than on a multilateral footing.24  He also 
doubts the effectiveness of intelligence sharing on multilateral basis.  
                                                 
21 European Council Committee of Experts on Terrorism, “Profiles on Counter Terrorist Capacity: 
Albania,” July 2010, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/4_theme_files/country_profiles/CODEXTER%20Profiles%20_2010_
%20Albania%20updated.pdf. 
22 Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the “New Europe” (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 60. 
23 Lord Robertson, “Tackling Terror: NATO’S New Mission” (speech by NATO Secretary General at 
the American Enterprise Institute’s New Atlantic Initiative in Washington, DC, June 20, 2002) 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020620a.htm. 
24 Byman, The Five Front War, 205. 
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Similarly, Foster and Wallace argue that “the formulation of a broad response to 
the challenges posed by transnational terrorism is beyond NATO’s capabilities or its 
appropriate functions.”25 In their opinion, because the European Union (EU) and the G-8 
group of leading economies are in a better position to develop networks of interagency 
cooperation, which are essential in dealing with transnational terrorism, there is no need 
to transform NATO into an “anti-terrorist alliance.” 
De Nevers notes that NATO’s missions have increased “dramatically since the 
end of the Cold War.”26 Nonetheless, she concludes that NATO has merely a supporting 
role in fighting international terrorism. She points out that “many of the essential 
activities of the fight against terrorism occur outside NATO, through bilateral 
cooperation or loose coalitions of the willing.”27 Bebler arrives at the same conclusion 
about the supportive role of NATO in fighting terrorism. He analyzes such constraints on 
the alliance as, legal frameworks, the decision-making process, and military capabilities 
and concludes that “NATO is not well-suited to effectively counter the threat of 
transnational terrorism.”   
On the other hand, many studies on the topic have put forward a more positive 
assessment of the role of NATO in fighting terrorism. Ellis, after making an analytical 
survey of the literature on counterterrorism strategies, suggests that NATO can play an 
important role on “four main realms being, diplomacy, military operations, intelligence-
sharing, and defence cooperation.”28  In the same vein, the U.S. Atlantic Council’s 2005 
Policy Paper on NATO’s role in confronting terrorism provides a comprehensive 
framework of the functions for which the alliance is suitable. The tasks include 
“generating political will, providing intelligence, managing coordination and integration 
efforts, interdicting terrorist recruitment, financing, supply and operations, preventing 
                                                 
25 Anthony Foster and William Wallace, “What is NATO for?” Survival 43:4 (2001):107. 
26 Anton Bebler, “NATO and Transnational Terrorism,” Perceptions 9:4 (Winter 2004 – 2005):159.  
27 Renee de Nevers, “NATO’s International Security Role in the Terrorist Era,” International Security, 
31:4 (2007): 34.  
28 Brent Ellis, “If It’s Not Terrorism, It’s Not Relevant: Evaluating NATO’s Potential to Contribute to 
the Campaign against Terrorism,” NPSIA Occasional Paper no. 41, (2003), 9, 
http://www.carleton.ca/csds/docs/occasional_papers/npsia-41.pdf . 
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terrorist operations, managing the consequences of terrorist attacks and arranging security 
assistance.”29 The paper puts forward that NATO has a comparative advantage in these 
tasks over such other international organizations as the UN and the EU. Specifically, the 
paper finds that NATO can offer more than an only-military response to terrorism.  
Many scholars think that global terrorism should be addressed within the realm of 
international cooperation, which forms one of NATO’s stronger suits. As Miguel Angel 
Ballesteros argues: “NATO, due to its infrastructure, experience, and the characteristics 
of its members, seems to be the best equipped international organization to do this.”30  
Lord Robertson emphasizes the need for international cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism and argues that “a permanent coalition is better than a temporary one. An 
interoperable coalition is better than an incapable one. A value-sharing coalition is better 
than a coalition of convenience. And a NATO coalition is better than anything else.”31 
Gheciu reinforces this idea, arguing that based on the alliance’s long tradition of building 
trust among the members, NATO is able “to build the kind of network of domestic and 
international agencies across the Euro-Atlantic area that is needed in the comprehensive 
struggle against the new enemies to Western values and way of life.”32 Moreover, Nelson 
writes that “NATO has the potential, as it did during the Cold War, to offer an attractive, 
positive vision of diversity, tolerance and progress beneath its security umbrella that 
could make a valuable contribution to the overall confrontation with international 
terrorists.”33 
At issue, in part, is NATO’s own transformation amid the changed circumstance 
of the post–Cold War era.  For example, Asmus, too, recognizes the importance of the 
                                                 
29 C. Richard Nelson, “NATO’s Role in Confronting International Terrorism,” Atlantic Council of 
United States Policy Paper (June 2004): 14, http://www.goodharbor.net/media/images/books/pdf-NATO-
role-confronting-terrorism.pdf . 
30 Miguel Angel Ballesteros, “Nato’s Role in the Fight against International Terrorism” (translated 
from Spanish), 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/e9bf71004f018677baa8fe3170baead1/Ballesteros853.
pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=e9bf71004f018677baa8fe3170baead1(accessed May 10, 2011). 
31 Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, “Tackling Terror: NATO’S New Mission” 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020620a.htm . 
32 Gheciu, NATO in the “New Europe,” 249. 
33 Nelson, “NATO’s Role in Confronting International Terrorism,” 11.  
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alliance in the war on terrorism, but at the same time, he emphasizes that NATO should 
continue to transform “so that it could be as effective in meeting the threats of the future 
as it had been in helping win the Cold War.”34 He suggests that NATO enlargement plays 
a positive role in achieving peace and security.  
NATO enlargement, it is argued, contributes to the twenty-first century struggle 
against instability and terrorism.35 Such institutions as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council (EAPC), PfP, the NATO-Russia Council, and the Mediterranean Dialogue, 
which NATO developed since the early 1990s to facilitate enlargement process and 
increase cooperation with partner countries, provide a good framework of “cooperative 
security,” which contributes significantly to combating terrorism. 36 For example, 
immediately after the September 11 attacks, “EAPC defense ministers affirmed their 
determination to utilize the partnership to increase cooperation and capabilities against 
terrorism.”37 The EAPC adopted the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, which 
asks partners to improve counterterrorism efforts at home and increase cooperation by 
sharing information and experience.38 In addition, partner countries, including Albania, 
made substantial contributions to ISAF in Afghanistan.39 Certainly, NATO’s engagement 
of and in counterterrorism has moved its member states, including Albania, toward a 
consensus on the appropriate policies and measures for counterterrorism. The Atlantic 
Council Policy Paper suggests that NATO’s response to terrorism “is partly responsible 
for the fact that terrorism has now become a high priority consideration on the national 
security agendas of countries directly affiliated with NATO, including those taking part 
                                                 
34 Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 305. 
35 Ryan C. Hendrickson et. al., “NATO Membership For Albania And Croatia: Military 
Modernization, Geo-Strategic Opportunities And Force Projection” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 
22:4, (2009): 502. 
36 Ellis, “If It’s Not Terrorism, It’s Not Relevant,” 9. 
37 Jeffrey Simon, “Partnership for Peace: Charting a Course for a New Era,” Strategic Forum, no. 206 
(March 2004), 2, http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada422608.pdf. 
38 Simon,“Partnership for Peace,” 2. 
39 According to NATO 11 PfP countries had almost 2,000 troops deployed in Afghanistan, as of 
August 2010. Source: United States Government Accountability Office, DOD Needs to Assess U.S. 
Assistance in Response to Changes to the Partnership for Peace Program, Report to the Chairman, 
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, September 2010, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d101015.pdf. 
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in its Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialogue.”40 According to the same 
source, Partnership for Peace is a useful tool to improve partner countries’ capacities to 
address terrorism. NATO, based on the close relations developed through PfP, is able to 
cooperate with partner countries on security issues related to the fight against 
international terrorism.41 This cooperation covers a wide range of activities, including the 
Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism adopted by NATO in 2002.42 
 METHODS AND SOURCES E.
I intend to use the detailed case study method as the basic analytic approach of 
contemporary history to the research question, with Albania providing the case by which 
to study the ways that NATO can help shape a new member’s strategic culture. While the 
specifics of Albania’s experience, at one level, reflect their time and place, the general 
trends and developments in Albania’s transformation, particularly in the fraught realm of 
counterterrorism, and offer important insights into the internal and external workings of 
the alliance. Albania was selected because NATO’s effects and effectiveness in different 
stages and aspects of NATO-Albanian relations could be analyzed.  
I will analyze Albania’s counterterrorism efforts in light of NATO-Albanian 
relations. In so doing, I will focus my analysis on three elements: public attitudes, policy, 
and defense institutions. These three elements ably capture both the depth and the breadth 
of the transformation of Albanian strategic culture since 1990 in association with NATO. 
The narrower focus on counterterrorism allows for more detailed attention to the forces 
that shape these elements. The object of this analysis is less to document every policy 
statement or media utterance in some effort to quantify the process of “NATO-izing” 
Albanian national counterterrorism policy and practice. Instead, I propose a broader 
approach that emphasizes points of interconnection and change. In this analysis, a 
particular focus is placed on the ramifications of these links to the future of Albania and 
its role in the Alliance.    
                                                 
40 Nelson,“NATO’s Role in Confronting International Terrorism,” 14.  
41 Russell D. Howard, “Thinking Creatively In The War On Terrorism: Leveraging NATO and the 
Partnership For Peace Consortium,” Connections (Spring 2005):  2–5.  
42 Ibid. 
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I make use of both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include 
NATO communiqués, NATO main documents such as strategic concepts, military 
concepts, partnership and accession documents, national strategies, action plans and 
official public statements. Secondary sources include analytical articles, media reports, 
and scholarly works related to the research question. A big portion of the material that I 
will use is from Albanian sources, which provide an Albanian point of view on the 
research question. 
Overall, this thesis will proceed in a chronological manner guided by a 
contemporary history method of analysis. This approach will reveal most clearly the steps 
and stages of the transformation of Albania’s national counterterrorism policy (and its 
strategic culture) as it developed; after all, the process forms a central part of this 
analysis.  Additionally, a chronology will allow me to cover the wide range of topics that 
fill out the categories of popular support, policy, and defense institutions—and that 
connect them to one another—in the most straightforward manner, highlighting the major 
and minor turning points. 
 THESIS OVERVIEW F.
The thesis is organized as a chronological examination of Albania’s relations with 
NATO in the realm of counterterrorism since the collapse of Albania’s Cold War 
communist government in 1990. Following the introductory chapter, which explains the 
thesis and its main research question, methodology, and relevant background literature, 
each subsequent chapter encapsulates a particular stage in the NATO-Albanian 
relationship, focusing on the counterterrorism context particular to each period. Chapter 
II covers Albania’s “pre-NATO” years—from 1990, when the country first opened (or 
reopened) to the world after decades of a repressive communist regime, to the eve of 
Albania joining NATO’s Membership Action Plan in 1999.  In this period, Albania first 
withstood an exodus of people to other European countries amid doubts about the 
country’s future prospects. However, anti-communists prevailed in the country’s 
democratic elections in 1992, and the task of rebuilding and reorienting Albania began in 
earnest.  Officially, Albania retained (and retains) its secular footing, but the communist-
era ban on religious worship was overturned in these years. With a clear Muslim majority 
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(around 70 percent of the population), Albania attracted attention from Islamic states, as 
well as its European neighbors. In this early phase, most of these contacts were 
benevolent—Islamic NGOs took up charity work in the country, while young Albanians 
were sent to Islamic countries for religious education. However, some Islamic extremist 
organizations also began to establish themselves in Albania, using the country mostly to 
launder money or otherwise support their activities elsewhere. In other words, the threat 
of Islamic extremism in Albania became real at this time. Albania’s Western orientation 
also came more clearly into relief, however. Albania was one of the first former 
communist countries to express interest in joining NATO, and in 1992, it joined the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Public support ran very high, as did 
political cohesion. Joining NATO became a major political goal in this period, and this 
ambition, with elite and popular support, shaped the succeeding stages of Albania’s 
transformation. 
In 1994 Albania joined PfP and NATO-Albanian relationship saw Albania’s first 
official steps toward NATO as an institution and a community of values, despite the 
ongoing turmoil of domestic reform. With the country’s membership in PfP, Albania 
initiated military and defense-sector reforms in accordance with the program. In 1997, 
however, this progress was nearly undone by a popular uprising that was caused by the 
collapse of some financial pyramid schemes that swept away the savings of Albanians. 
The Albanian state disintegrated amid the turmoil.  Military depots were looted by the 
population and the weapons and explosives fell into civilian hands—some of them 
members of criminal bands.  Lawlessness and gangsterism flourished. In April 1997, the 
UN mandated a multinational protection force led by Italy “to secure the delivery of 
humanitarian aid to Albania.”43  The newly elected government was quick to approach to 
NATO. The ministry of defense sent an official request for NATO support “in rebuilding 
the armed forces.”44 NATO, in the framework of PfP, approved an Individual Action 
                                                 
43George Katsirdakis, “Albania: A Case Study in the Practical Implementation of Partnership for 
Peace,” NATO Review, vol 46, no. 2, (Summer 1998): 23 http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9802–
07.htm.  
44 Ibid., 22. 
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Plan which envisaged both NATO and bilateral assistance from NATO allies.45 By 1999, 
with the NATO operation in Kosovo, public support in Albania for the alliance reached 
another high point.  
Chapter III explores the next stage in Albania’s relationship with NATO, namely 
the momentous years from 1999, when Albania became a MAP country, through the 
signing of NATO’s Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T) and the NATO 
military concept for defense against terrorism in 2002. It proceeds with the penultimate 
phase of NATO-Albanian relations, from 2003 to 2008, during which Albania’s 
integration of and in NATO’s counterterrorism framework moved from mostly planning 
to implementation, with major domestic and international operations and exercises.  
This period is characterized by the deepening involvement of NATO in Albania—
and vice-versa, even as the alliance instituted new measures specifically in the realm of 
counterterrorism as the Global War on Terror began to take shape. In 2001, NATO 
Headquarters Tirana was established to help Albania with military reforms and 
partnership goals.  Then, came the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States 
and NATO’s subsequent invocation of Article 5. Albania aligned itself formally and 
publically with NATO and the United States. Terrorism—and, as a consequence, 
counterterrorism—assumes an increasingly prominent role in alliance planning and 
policy. In 2001 the Ministry of Defense of Albania issued the Membership Action Plan, 
which included many objectives to improve the internal and external security. One of 
them was to increase “compliance and participation in international efforts to fight 
terrorism and organized crime in relation to the participation of Albania in the 
antiterrorist coalition of states.”46 One of the earliest indications of this shift came in 
2002, when NATO inked the PAP-T. The agreement covered such areas as political 
consultation, partnership goals against terrorism, intelligence sharing, civil emergency 
planning, terrorism financing, border controls, and so on.47  In other words, the PAP-T 
                                                 
45Ibid., 22–26. 
46 Enika Abazi, “Defense Reform of the Albanian Armed Forces: Democratization and 
Transformation,” (n.d.), http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/co/co_sep04/co_sep04c.pdf. 
47 North Atlantic Treaty Organization,“The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism,” March 5, 
2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50084.htm (accessed May 12, 2011). 
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specifically extended NATO methods to the realm of counterterrorism. NATO’s Military 
Concept for Defense against Terrorism followed the same year. Albania responded with 
its own national counterterrorism action plan in 2002 and the adoption of various 
counterterrorism goals in line with the NATO documents. In 2003, the country adopted a 
law against terrorism and froze the assets of Islamist organizations linked to al Qaeda—
where only a decade or so earlier, such entities operated more or less as they liked in 
Albania.  This point suggests just how Albania’s association with NATO had already 
helped reshape the country’s views on and measures against terrorism. 
In 2003, Albanian forces deploy in support of the NATO-led ISAF force in 
Afghanistan, arguably the largest show of allied counterterrorism measures. In 2004, the 
discovery of a cache of chemical weapons, which had been acquired by Albania’s old 
communist regime during the 1970s, brought home (again) concerns about terrorism. 
“Undocumented or poorly secured weapons caches could be exploited by terrorists with 
deadly effect.”48 That same year, the Albanian government’s National Security Strategy 
acknowledged terrorism as a major threat; subsequently, the 2005 National Military 
Strategy focused on Albania’s fight against terrorism. Between 2005 and 2007, three 
major exercises—Cooperative Engagement (2005), Cooperative Longbow (2007), and 
Cooperative Lancer (2007)—were conducted in Albania. Among the objectives of these 
exercises was achieving interoperability in the fight against terrorism. In 2007, the 
Albanian Navy joined operation Active Endeavor, NATO’s ongoing operation in the 
Mediterranean, sharing information about the maritime domain. Albania was invited to 
join NATO in 2008, capping this period of extensive cooperation, internally and 
international, in counterterrorism, as well as other alliance security concerns. 
Chapter IV brings the story of Albania’s transformation within NATO up to date, 
including Albania’s formal accession to alliance membership in 2009.  It analyzes the 
state of Albania’s transformed armed forces—now a completely professional military—
                                                 
48 Joby Warrick, “Albania’s Chemical Cache Raises Fears about Others,” Washington Post, January 
10, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A61698–2005Jan9?language=printer. 
 Albania destroyed its chemical weapons stock in 2007, becoming the first country in the world 
without chemical weapons. The program was financed by the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Fund. 
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as well as such indications of ongoing change as the pending changes to Albania’s 
National Security Strategy, in light of NATO’s 2010 strategic concept. Assessing the 
developments within Albania’s national counterterrorism response, specifically as NATO 
has shaped them, this chapter concludes that, in the case of Albania, NATO was 
successful in fighting international terrorism through the partnership program, just as 
Albania succeeded in aligning its national counterterrorism response with NATO 
standards and requirements. These changes were sufficiently accepted sufficiently early 
that they even withstood the near collapse of the country amid popular uprising in 1997. 
(In this connection, Albania’s incentives to cooperate may inform any revisions of 
NATO’s Partnership Action Plan to promote effective cooperation.) Today, it seems that 
these NATO-informed counterterrorism measures are widely viewed in Albania as key to 
the country’s ongoing stability and security. While such eventualities as major losses of 
Albanian lives in Afghanistan could diminish Albanians’ general contentment with their 
country’s involvement in NATO, the striking transformation of Albania’s 
counterterrorism institutions speaks to a real and lasting shift in its strategic culture 
through the ongoing NATO-Albania engagement. 
The final chapter draws conclusions, about the implications of NATO’s response 
to terrorism for Albania in the dimensions of international security, defense and military 
affairs, as well as domestic security. It considers some implications for the armed forces 
and brings in some consideration on how the future of Albania’s counterterrorism 
partnership with and in NATO might unfold. At the chapters offers some 
















II. THE BEGINNING OF ALBANIAN-NATO RELATIONS 
This chapter explores Albanian-NATO relations starting from the end of the Cold 
War, which brought to the end the harsh communist regime and marked the beginning of 
the relations between Albania and NATO, until 1999, just before Albania became a 
Membership Action Plan country, institutionalizing further these relations. This period of 
time is very important in the development of NATO-Albania relations because of the 
events and the decisions that paved a positive direction for this relationship. The chapter 
begins with an analysis of the situation in Albania in the post–Cold-War environment and 
an examination of the challenges and the threats that emerged with the demise of 
communism and the transition to democracy. In these years of drastic change and 
reorientation, new threats emerged to national and regional security: Islamic terrorism, 
weak institutions, domestic political instability, irredentism, and regional instability. As 
this chapter shows, Albania’s increasingly close relationship with NATO provided not 
only the external requirements but the internal motivation for Tirana to undertake a 
democratically inflected, western-oriented, and stability-enhancing response to these 
threats. 
As such, this chapter turns specifically to the role of Albanian-NATO relations, 
the platforms of cooperation (such as NACC and PfP), the assistance of NATO in 
overcoming the internal crisis of 1997, and the cooperation with NATO in the resolution 
of the most acute Kosovo crises, all of which helped build mutual trust and partnership. 
Albania’s ensuing aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration and cooperation, amid 
NATO’s active engagement in the region, played a major role in preventing international 
terrorism from gaining a foothold in Albania.  
      ALBANIA AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR A.
The end of the Cold War thrust Albania out of its self-imposed isolation—and 
into a rapidly unraveling Balkan region, while the multi-faith state grappled with 
democratization, economic restructuring, border disputes, mass migrations, and not-
always-friendly interest from other states in and beyond the region.  The West provided 
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one model of the future for Albanians but, at least in the first years after the fall of the 
communist regime, certainly not the only one. 
1.      The fall of the Communist Regime in Albania 
During the communist regime, Albania was one of the most isolated countries in 
the world. After leaving the Warsaw Pact in 1968, and after breaking the relations with 
China in 1978 over disagreements about communist orthodoxy, Albania found itself in a 
“strategic vacuum.”49  The old government militarized the country and lavished already 
scarce resources on territorial defense. The national defense strategy, such that it was, 
aimed to repel any aggression from neighboring countries, NATO, or the Warsaw Pact 
through extensive permanent fortifications and total mobilization of the population. 
These plans reflected the official paranoia that suffused the communist regime. Between 
1976 and 1982, the government built 350,000 fortified concrete elements—bunkers—that 
were planted all over the country. (As a result, Albanians faced severe housing shortages 
for many years because the cost of constructing a single bunker was almost equal to the 
cost of an apartment house.)50 The total defense envisaged massive armed forces 
numbering about 120,000 active duty personnel, while 500,000 reservists (in a country 
with a population at the time of perhaps 2.8 million) could be mobilized on short order. 
Fearing a military coup as much as an attack from outside, the regime also decentralized 
the military, dispersing it a large number of small installations all over the country. It also 
exercised fierce political control over the military elite.51  
The strategy of isolation also spoke to the regime’s ambitions to create a new 
identity for Albanians based on “true” communist ideology. While all outside influences 
were suspect, the regime was especially keen to cut Albanians’ ties with the Western 
world, whose values were seen as anti-communist. However, forty-five years of reprisals 
                                                 
49 Adem Copani, “Partnership for Peace and New Dimensions of Albania’s Security Posture,” NATO 
Review, no. 2, l, 44 (March 1996), 24-28, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1996/9602–6.htm. 
50 Ibid. 
51 The military elite were often put under accusation of betrayal of the political line of the Party and 
were punished by the communist regime. In 1974 the communist regime executed the ministry of defense, 
the chief of staff and other generals on the grounds of working for foreign powers and jeopardizing the 
development of the military. None of them accepted the accusation.  
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and propaganda were not enough to extinguish in Albanians the desire to be part of the 
Western community. For many years, most Albanians secretly watched Italian TV with 
homemade receivers. As one Albania scholar put it: “To many Albanians living under the 
country’s communist regime, Italy was a symbol of freedom and the West, and Italian 
radio and TV broadcasts were the most important way in which Albanians were exposed 
to the West.”52 Thus did Albanians keep alive their hopes for a regime change—and 
freedom? 
In July 1990, some 5,000 people challenged the regime and entered the western 
embassies in Tirana, asking for political asylum. This event, in fact, came as a big blow 
to the legitimacy of the communist regime, which, with the “wind of democracy” in the 
Eastern Europe at its back, had promised liberalization and was trying to portray the 
situation in Albania as under control. In March of 1991, after a dubious but nonetheless 
multiparty election, the regime grudgingly began to honor this promise, implementing 
some democratic reforms—making Albania the last European state to do so.  In June, the 
first opposition government took office, led by a former communist. Ten days later, 
James Baker paid an official visit to Tirana, the first visit of a U.S. Secretary of State to 
Albania. Baker was welcomed by crowds of thousands—the New York Times reported “a 
sea of Albanians”53—who gathered in the main square of the capital to listen to his 
famous words, “Freedom works.”54 
Arguably, even these modest steps sufficed to whet—but not slake—Albanians’ 
desire for reform and westernization. In August 1991, around 300,000 Albanians fled 
dramatically to Italy across the Adriatic on improvised and overloaded boats. Before, 
Europe knew very little of its Albanian neighbors; suddenly, in their poverty and 
desperation, they appeared as a potential wave of refugees from a collapsing Balkan state. 
In December 1991, amid worsening economic straits and widespread social unrest, the 
                                                 
52 Kosta Barjaba, “Albania: Looking beyond Borders,” Migration Information Source, August 2004, 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=239. 
53 “300,000 Albanians Pour into Streets to Welcome Baker,” The New York Times, June 23, 1991. 
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54  Norman Kempster, “Albanians Mob Baker, Cheer U.S : Europe: ‘Freedom Works,’ He Exhorts a 
Rally of 200,000,” Los Angeles Times, June 23, 1991 http://articles.latimes.com/1991–06–23/news/mn-
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coalition government that had greeted Secretary Baker collapsed. Elections were called 
for March of 1992; in the interim, the government was headed by a non-communist 
independent.55 
In these slightly delayed 1992 elections, the Democratic Party won a landslide 
victory finally ending the more than four decades of communist rule in Albania. The new 
government adopted an open policy toward the world, seeking enthusiastically to 
improve the international relations that almost had not existed since the end of World 
War II. Although there was an inclination to prioritize the relations with the West, 
Albania sought close relations with the Islamic countries as well.  
Muslims make up the biggest religious community in Albania, composing around 
70 percent of the population. During the communist regime, all practice of religion was 
banned, clerics were decapitated, and mosques, churches, and monasteries were 
destroyed to extirpate religion from Albanian lives. Religion was eventually legalized 
after 1991, but it faced major financial problems in rebuilding congregations—and the 
infrastructure of worship—as well as in educating new clerics. Despite burgeoning 
interest in religious practice among Albania’s young Muslims, the Albanian Muslim 
community suffered from all these legacy issues, as well.56  In 1992 Albania joined the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The OIC is “the collective voice of the 
Muslim world [which aims] to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in 
the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony among various people of the 
world.”57 Membership marked an avenue by which Albania hoped to address the needs of 
its Muslim majority.  It also opened the road for many Islamic organizations to press into 
Albania. 
                                                 
55 Parliamentary Chamber of Albania, “Elections held in 1992,” April, 1992, 
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2001_92.htm. 




57 Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, (n.d.),  http://www.oic-oci.org/page_detail.asp?p_id=52. 
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2.      The Security Challenges of Albania after the Cold War  
The end of the cold war and the demise of the communist regime brought a 
completely new security situation for Albania. The new threats—more acute than the old 
government’s paranoid fantasies—included serious economic problems inherited from 
the failure of the centralized economy system and its primitive industry, a vacuum in the 
legal framework, and weak institutions. Such phenomena, unknown before, as organized 
crime, corruption58, and illegal trafficking, began to bloom. “The creation of a new 
economic system and the process of rebuilding state institutions had to take place 
simultaneously.”59  
This process needed guidance, assistance, and support from beyond Albania’s 
borders. Western investors were reluctant to sink money or effort in Albania because of 
the uncertainties of its reforms and transition to democracy. This circumstance, in turn, 
also informed Albania’s joining the OIC, perhaps in the hope that membership would 
attract investment from oil-rich Islamic countries out of common religious ties. Indeed, 
after Albania joined the OIC, the government also suspended all visas requirements for 
Islamic countries. Islamic entrepreneurs came, but not all of them aiming to resuscitate 
Albania’s trade and infrastructure. A lot of Muslims from Arabic Countries came to 
Albania to revive Islam, some of whom were suspected by the Albanian intelligence 
service and Western Intelligence Agencies as Islamic terrorists.60  Islamic NGOs 
financed hospitals, aqueducts, orphanages, and other amenities for the poor—as well as 
the construction of 400 new mosques and eight madrasahs. In addition, they provided 
scholarships and financial assistance to young Albanians to study theology at Arab 
                                                 
58 Corrupt tendencies existed during the communist regime, too. In fact, their roots go back to the 
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universities. These students came back to Albania with a more radicalized form of Islam, 
which was opposite of the liberal Islam traditionally practiced by Albanians.61 
The new democratic state, facing widespread corruption and lax border control, 
lacked the will, structure, and experience to investigate the activities of charity 
organizations and extremist groups that poured into Albania. Some Islamic organizations 
took advantage of this situation to promote their extremist religious objectives under the 
guise of fostering the Albanian economy. Extremist Islamism could have posed a real 
threat not only to religious tolerance and the peaceful coexistence of the religious 
communities in Albania, but also to the aspirations of the country for Euro-Atlantic 
integration—to say nothing of the security and stability of Europe’s Balkan flank.  
Indeed, the Balkan connection made the issue of Islam in Albania even more 
urgent—for both Tirana and the West. In particular, the atrocities committed by 
Milosevic’s regime against the Albanians of Kosovo brought to the forefront the 
Albanian national cause, which had been seriously subverted—but not diverted—during 
the communist regime. As Rakipi aptly puts it, “Kosovo, like other Albanian territories, 
was not a target of Albanian state policy.”62 Although, as history reveals, Albania never 
embraced irredentism as a state policy, post-Cold War events called for a regional role 
for Albania. Now, Albania is the mother state of a nation, of which fully half of the 
members (ethnic Albanians outside Albania) live in three other border countries—in a 
region infamous for its ethnic conflicts. On the one hand, then, Albania bears some 
responsibility for defending the rights of ethnic Albanians as a national obligation; on the 
other hand, the new democracy had a responsibility to itself and its neighbors to maintain 
peace and stability in the region. 63 Strikingly, Albania realized that unilateral action 
                                                 
61 There prevails a specific culture of religious harmony and co-existence in Albania, which owes to 
the purposeful policies of the founders of the modern Albanian state in the nineteenth century. Based on 
this cosmopolitanism, updated from the heyday of the Hellenistic world, the four main religious 
communities present in Albania have had good relations with each other. “Everywhere you go in Albania, 
people speak of the country’s tradition of religious tolerance and that there is complete harmony between 
the different faiths.”  Inter-faith marriages are very common, and Albanians like to celebrate religious days 
together. In the absence of formal Islamic education during the communist regime, Albanians inherited 
from their families the Islamic traditions intertwined with Albanian culture of religious tolerance. The 
extremist religious type of Islam that the Islamic organizations attempted to introduce to the country was 
very different from the Albanian religious culture.   
62 Rakipi, Weak States & Security: Rethinking the Balkan Post-Cold War Security Agenda, 97. 
63 Ethnic Albanians live in Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. 
 25 
would achieve neither goal—nor would irredentist policies. The national cause could be 
better served in the context of international cooperation, in which Albania had to build a 
credible positive profile. 
Last, but not least, the Albanian people needed confidence that the communist 
regime would not come back again. The best guarantee was to ensure the people that the 
future of the country would be within the community that defeated communism, the 
Euro-Atlantic community.  
For all of these reasons—the specter of Islamist extremism, the fractious lure of 
irredentism, and the shadow of a communist resurgence—Euro-Atlantic integration 
became the major foreign policy objective of Albania. Presently, whole-hearted 
westernization achieved the absolute consensus of all political forces and support from 
almost the entire population.64 In other words, Albanians believed that the benefits of 
NATO membership would outweigh its costs.   
 ALBANIAN-NATO RELATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR B.
Being part of Euro-Atlantic alliance entails sharing the democratic values and 
principles with western countries. This stance promotes democratic reform and free 
economy, improves the image of the country in the world, and creates guarantees for t 
foreign investors. Furthermore, instead of maintaining a massive army, which drained 
national resources in the name of exaggerated territorial defense, westernization means 
developing a modern, professional military to contribute to collective defense. Next, 
being part of such a prestigious security organization as NATO improves the reputation 
and the image of the country in its international relations, particularly in connection with 
the rights of ethnic Albanians beyond the national borders. At the same time, this 
approach makes national movements less feasible by channeling the nationalist energies 
and attentions of Albanians into successful, multilateral and international models, rather 
than revanchism or extremism. Because the western Balkans also aspired to join NATO, 
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cooperation and trust among neighbor countries increases, promoting peace and stability 
in the region. In the words of Albanian Prime Minister Fatos Nano: 
Albania’s governing policy, as well as our foreign policy, is to try to 
prevent a security vacuum from returning to our region, since that would 
mean a return to the ugly past of totalitarianism and national conflicts. To 
that end, we are ridding ourselves of the ghosts of the past and are 
working to build a society that responds to current development needs, and 
one that is prepared for future challenges and is compatible with Western 
societies.65  
1.      Albania Joins the NACC  
At the NATO summit in Rome, the alliance adopted a new strategic concept that 
established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a mechanism for 
institutional cooperation with South Eastern European states.66  Albania was admitted to 
the NACC in June 1992. Immediately thereafter, many Albanian parliamentarians, 
journalists, politicians, and military personnel visited NATO headquarters in Brussels and 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, participating in 
seminars and conferences and meeting with alliance officials. This process of 
socialization aimed to increase Albanian public knowledge and to teach Albanian elites 
how the alliance worked.67  
Already in December 1992, President Sali Berisha became the first Albanian 
leader to visit the NATO HQ in Brussels. He met with Secretary-General Manfred 
Wörner and discussed the situation in the Balkans, raising concerns about the situation in 
Kosovo. Berisha clearly articulated Tirana’s westernization calculus—that Albania is “for 
peace and stability in the region, not for the change of the borders,” and he described the 
cooperation with NATO as very important for the peace and stability of the Balkans. He 
officially submitted the application of Albania to join the alliance.68 
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In March 1993, Manfred Wörner became the first NATO Secretary General to 
visit Albania. The visit was a strong sign of the alliance’s willingness to “extend the hand 
of cooperation to Albania.”69 Wörner, in his speech before the Albanian Parliament, 
declared that Albania belonged to Europe. These solemn words went beyond merely 
recognizing the western identity of Albanians. NATO was aware of the difficult situation 
of Albania concerning the fate of ethnic Albanians living outside the country and it 
praised Tirana’s foreign policy of restraint and its efforts to cooperate extensively with 
the international community for the security and stability of the region.70 NATO saw 
Albania as a responsible and trusted partner that could play a constructive role in the 
peace and stability of the region. 
2.      Albania Joins Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
On the other hand Albania saw cooperation with NATO as very important for its 
own security, for defending the democratic rights of ethnic Albanians and for promoting 
peace and stability in the region. Thus, in 1994, Albania joined the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) program.  PfP, launched at the Brussels Summit, was and is basically a cooperation 
initiative between NATO and non-NATO members that aims “to protect and promote 
liberal freedom, justice, and peace through democracy.”71 PfP includes a wide range of 
joint NATO-partner activities that serve to familiarize partner countries with the norms, 
practices, and procedures of NATO. PfP is a useful tool not only to prepare aspirant 
states to join the alliance but also to measure their commitment and capabilities.72  
The program provided Albania with a real opportunity to strengthen its relations 
with NATO. Although participation in PfP was not a guarantee of membership, it served 
as a stage of active integration into the alliance.73 According to President Berisha, 
Partnership for Peace was not only or even primarily about the military aspects of the 
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Alliance. He suggested that, more importantly, the political values that underlay PfP 
would serve to promote trust among neighboring and non-neighboring countries.74 Still, 
President Berisha asserted that Albania should insist on full NATO membership as a both 
an engine and a confirmation of Albania’s Euro-Atlantic integration.  
NATO-Albania PfP cooperation was enriched by two key elements: Individual 
Partnership Programs (IPP) and the Planning and Reviewing Process (PARP). “IPP is 
designed to bring together all the various cooperation mechanisms through which a 
partner country interacts with the Alliance, sharpening the focus of activities to better 
support their domestic reform efforts.”75  “Under this framework, the program included a 
range of PfP activities specific to Albania and covered a wide range beginning from 
military reforms and democratic control of armed forces to civil emergency preparedness. 
The PfP activities included military exercises, Mobile Training Teams (MTT), 
conferences, workshops, seminars, courses at NATO Centers of Excellence. All these 
activities aimed to socialize Albania with NATO way of thinking and of doing business 
and to help Albania develop defense concepts and capabilities to be used in support or 
within NATO operations. These activities increased the awareness of Albania about new 
asymmetric threats and new type of operations such as Crises Response Operations 
(CRO).”76 The international terrorism, transnational organized crime and proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction emerged as major threats to the security instead of state 
aggression as it used to be in the past. 
The Planning and Review Process (PARP) provides an organized instrument for 
identifying partner capabilities that could be offered to the Alliance for multinational 
training, exercises and operations. For partner countries participating in the PARP, it also 
works as the principal tool used to “guide and measure defense and military progress.”77 
PARP was an essential part of PfP for reforming the Albanian military in order to 
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increase the interoperable with the ally forces and to adapt her to face the asymmetrical 
threats.78 NATO sent several working groups to Albania to assist with identifying the 
forces and capabilities that Albania wanted to make available for PfP activities and to 
improve its interoperability with allied forces in many PfP cooperation fields, beginning 
from peacekeeping and humanitarian operations to crises response operations. 
Additionally, PARP was designed as a mechanism for providing regular exchanges of 
information among allies and Albania in order to increase transparency on overall 
defense plans. It showed Albania's policies, plans, and its commitments toward NATO, 
thus providing a good tool for allies to consider and assess Albanian NATO 
membership.79 Through PARP Albanian defense plans were oriented toward a collective 
defense approach to the security threats. For example, Albanian Army disbanded many 
army units such as army divisions containing tank battalions or air defense battalions, 
reducing substantially the number of active military personnel but on the other hand 
developed small elite military capabilities such as Rapid Reaction Brigade and 
Commando Regiment able to handle crises response operations, fight against terrorism or 
deploy in support of NATO operations.  
Albania took the PfP initiative very seriously. In 1995, the Albanian armed forces 
participated in twelve exercises with NATO in the United States, Greece, and Italy—the 
first time Albanian troops took part in military exercises outside the country. These 
exercises served not only to increase the interoperability of the Albanian Armed Forces 
but also to familiarize them with NATO practices and process and to develop good 
personal relations with NATO forces.  
In 1996, Albania took another step in its cooperation with NATO by deciding to 
send thirty-three troops in NATO-led multinational peace support operation, the 
Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. IFOR was mandated by a UN 
Security Council Resolution to implement the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The Albanian contingent, after training for peacekeeping operations in 
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Germany, served as an independent unit of the German unit in IFOR.80 This active 
participation in IFOR built on an earlier decision, when Albania had allowed NATO to 
use its airfield and ports to plan operations in Bosnia. This modest contribution to the first 
NATO-led mission in Balkans, despite the economic difficulties and the security risks, 
was an indicator that Albania was emerging as a reliable partner who was ready to play 
an active role in the peace and stability of the region.81  
3.      1997 Internal Crises, Extremist Islamism and NATO’s Stabilizing Role  
Despite the positive democratic developments in its early post-communism years, 
Albania remained a weak state making a difficult transition to democracy. Its democratic 
institutions were not consolidated and the legal framework was incomplete. At the end of 
1996, the domestic political situation was unstable and the opposition parties boycotted 
the parliament after contesting the parliamentary elections.  
The already unstable political situation worsened with the spectacular collapse of 
several pyramid schemes that swept away the life savings of tens of thousands of 
Albanian citizens. These financial schemes had offered very high returns for a short 
amount of time. Albanians, whose years of isolation and authoritarian communism left 
them somewhat unprepared for the vicissitudes of capitalism when it arrived, saw these 
ventures as an easy way to get rich in a country that didn’t have much to offer.  
According to one source, by 1997, the sums invested in these Ponzi schemes reached a 
staggering US$1.2 billion—more than 50 percent of the country’s GDP.82 The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States, and the European Union all issued 
warnings about alleged money laundering; the Tirana government was reluctant to outlaw 
the highly popular, if highly questionable, schemes. As such, when the pyramids 
collapsed, the government appeared complicit in the widespread financial ruin that 
followed. 
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The weak state fell amid outrage and violence after large popular revolts 
demanded that the government take full responsibility and resign.83 As the unrest 
accelerated, crowds attacked military depots and looted large amounts of weapons and 
ammunition.84 The military disintegrated together with other state institutions. In the 
ensuing chaos, organized crime and armed criminal bands flourished, actually 
undertaking state functions in many regions of the country. Many Albanians fled to Italy 
or Greece in an attempt to escape from the dangerous situation at home, which threatened 
a demographic crisis for Albania and its neighbors alike. Worse, the large number of 
weapons in unchecked circulation in a very poor and desperate population posed an even 
bigger concern for the region and the EU.  
The possibility that the weapons might have fallen into terrorists’ hands was 
considered an additional—and very real—threat. “With its weak governance, porous 
borders, and criminal networks, Albania [had] all the characteristics of a fragile state that 
could become a haven for terrorists.”85 For all such terrorist groups, “Albania was a 
major transit point for immigrants seeking to reach Europe from further east and south, 
such as Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan”86 not only to infiltrate into Europe, under the guise of 
genuine immigrants, but also to generate funds by coordinating the activities with the 
organized crime networks.87 Between 1994 and 1996, already the country began to be 
used as an interim point for Mujahedin from Afghanistan who were on their way to 
Bosnia to fight the Serbian army.88 Among the Islamic organizations that operated in 
Albania there were several radical Islamic terrorist groups that tried to advance their 
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terrorist objectives. “Islamic Egyptian Jihad,” “Egyptian Islamic Group,” “Algerian Front 
of Islamic Salvation,” and the “Islamic Armed Group of Algeria” were present and 
operating in Albania.89   
Terrorist organizations’ activity in Albania was mainly focused on using the 
permissive environment of the country as a safe haven for generating funds, conducting 
illegal activities, coordinating operations in the region, providing “asylum” to terrorist 
fugitives and spreading extremist religious ideology throughout the country.  They used 
the Islamic charitable NGOs for their activities. For example The International 
Humanitarian Islamic Organization (IIRO), the first Islamic NGO established in Albania, 
helped the mujahidin fighters in Bosnia with finances and logistical support.90 An 
Albanian office of the IIRO also employed Muhammad al Zawahiri, the brother of Bin 
Laden’s deputy, to assist with al-Qaeda’s terrorism efforts in the Balkans. The IIRO was 
one of the main organizations that supported the spread of Wahhabism. Wahhabism is “a 
conservative and intolerant form of Islam that is practiced in Saudi Arabia.”91 The sect 
seeks to purify Islam practices deviate from the seventh-century teachings of the Prophet 
Muhammad.92 Osama bin Laden practiced Wahhabism.  IIRO provided opportunities to 
Albanians to attend Wahhabism theology studies in Arab countries. 
Another Wahhabi charity organization sponsored by Saudi Arabia, the Al 
Haramain Association, was penetrated between 1993 and 1998 by the Islamic Egyptian 
Jihad (IEJ) and members of al-Qaeda. They formed a terrorist cell within the Al 
Haramain Association, which aimed to “recruit young Albanians, train them to forge 
documents, and prepare them to perform terrorist activities and acts of violence in 
Kosovo to further destabilize the internal situation in Albania by fomenting conflict 
among the country’s various religious groups.” The IEJ cell excelled in forgery and 
provided terrorist fugitives and operators with the necessary documents to travel in other 
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countries. The trial in Cairo of the captured members of this cell, called “the returnees 
from Albania,” brought to light facts about funds being generated and other activities to 
support operations in Europe.93 
The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) was another Islamic 
organization based in Albania that spread extremist religious propaganda in the country 
and sponsored Albanian youngsters to study Wahhabi theology in Arab countries.  It was 
co-founded by Osama bin Laden’s nephew, Abdulla bin Laden and the organization was 
linked to September 11 attacks. 
During late 1990s terrorist groups attempted several times to attack U.S. targets in 
Albania, showing that they were capable of planning and staging attacks as well. In 1997, 
the U.S. embassy in Tirana was even temporarily closed “when it was discovered that a 
faction of the Muslim Brotherhood was plotting an attack.”94 One year later, “Albania 
and the United States foiled another planned attack on the U.S. embassy in Tirana.”95 
Amid the ongoing and worsening turmoil, the Albanian government asked NATO 
for an international force to restore the order in Albania. However, NATO was reluctant 
to commit to an intervention in Albania; then-Secretary General Javier Solana ruled out 
any NATO-led military intervention in support of the government of Albania. 96  Instead, 
Solana emphasized political and diplomatic engagement first. Pettifer and Vickers, two 
prominent scholars of Albanian history, suggested that a possible reason that NATO 
rejected military intervention in Albania was to avoid taking sides in the conflict. This 
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step would have divided the country even more and would have soured the people on 
NATO.97 Taking into consideration that public support for NATO has always been 
higher than 90 percent, meaning that it was supported by followers of both political 
parties engaged in the political turmoil, NATO’s engagement either in support of the 
government or against it would have created discontent and anger in a highly politicised 
and divided public.   
Nor did the EU show much interest in mounting a peacekeeping operation in 
Albania, particularly with the wars in the former Yugoslavia only recently officially 
concluded. For example, Germany saw the Albanian crisis as an internal matter. Thus, 
before Tirana could hope for any international assistance, Albania’s political elites were 
pushed to come to an agreement to resolve the political deadlock.    
However, a UNSC resolution mandated a humanitarian intervention by a coalition 
composed of eleven European countries and led by Italy.98 The coalition also was 
supported by OSCE. Operation ALBA was in effect for a period of six months. Its main 
tasks were to secure the distribution of humanitarian aid and to secure the polling stations 
so that everybody could vote in the parliamentary elections as agreed by the political 
elites.99 There are different opinions about the success of this operation, and a thorough 
discussion is outside the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, it can be argued that Operation 
ALBA reinforced the public’s trust in international organizations, and the presence of 
western military forces that composed the coalition was widely welcomed. This 
experience created a suitable environment for the future deployment of NATO troops in 
Albania during the Kosovo crisis.Despite the domestic turmoil, political instability, and 
the reluctance of NATO to engage in military intervention in Albania, Albanian foreign 
policy objectives remained unchanged. At the Madrid Summit in 1997, Bashkim Fino, 
the prime minister of the care-taker government, declared that “integration into the 
Alliance remains an absolute priority of our foreign policy since this is our indisputable 
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aspiration and it is included in all programs of Albanian parties of the entire political 
spectrum.”100 He officially invited NATO to guide the restructuring of Albanian military 
through material and technical assistance, expertize and training and to channel also 
bilateral military assistance toward creating a small, professional, military forces able to 
deploy in NATO missions to address the new threats emerged after the cold war such as 
terrorism, proliferation of WMD, etc.101 
NATO accepted the request and decided to assist through the PfP framework. An 
Individual Partnership Plan (IPP) was tailored to meet the Albania’s specific needs. The 
IPP was signed in Brussels by the newly elected Prime Minister Nano. The IPP included 
NATO assistance in “reconstructing and restructuring the Albanian armed forces under 
civilian democratic control, as well as training activities to keep Albania engaged in 
PfP.”102 
The IPP was designed to coordinate not only the assistance that NATO as an 
organization would give but also the assistance of individual ally and partner countries. 
NATO sent twelve teams of experts to Albania in four months to assist in developing a 
conceptual framework, including a national security concept, military doctrine, civilian 
control, legal framework, and civil-military relations.  These delegations also helped to 
reorganize and re-function the Ministry of Defense, the general staff, and the major 
commands of the armed forces. They also provided technical assistance in securing 
armament storage sites and in ordinance disposal. At the same time, successful bilateral 
assistance programs with NATO nations improved basic infrastructure and trained 
personnel to face the challenges that the Albanian armed forces were going through. The 
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IPP program included military cooperation activities to help the Albanian armed forces to 
take full advantage of PfP exercises and trainings. 103 
Because the results of the IPP program in 1997 proved to be satisfactory to all 
sides, NATO decided to extend the IPP during 1998 as well. The eruption of Kosovo 
crises on the Albanian border had increased the urgency of reorganizing the Albanian 
Army. It had also emphasized the necessity of assisting the “Albanian authorities in 
addressing the possible consequences of the crisis in Kosovo, including possible 
assistance in communications, border control and refugee matters.”104 In order to 
coordinate and implement the IPP activities NATO opened a PfP Cell in Tirana on 1 June 
1998. According to NATO 
The opening of this office signal[ed] the Alliance's interest in developing 
closer relations with the Albanian authorities in the implementation of PfP 
activities. It [was] the first of its kind and represent[ed] NATO's 
commitment to carry out the special IPP within the unique circumstances 
found in Albania.105 
Katardikis argues that “the case of Albania has broken new ground in the 
evolution of PfP and has confirmed its position as a key element in the new European 
security structure.”106 
As NATO-Albania relations were growing closer and warmer, NATO-Albanian 
dialogue and consultations intensified. Between March 1998 and May 1999, the NATO 
Secretary General and Albanian Prime Ministers met five times—three times in Tirana 
and twice in Brussels—to discuss the situation in Kosovo. Albania was consistent in 
asking the alliance to intervene in Kosovo in order to stop the “ethnic cleansing” and 
restore peace and stability in the region. (Tirana was just as scrupulous in foreswearing 
any irredentist advantage-seeking in the conflict.) Prime Minister Fatos Nano, in different 
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speeches, emphasized that NATO was the only solution to Kosovo crises. He persistently 
asked NATO to deploy troops in Albania in order to prevent the conflict from 
spreading.107 Meanwhile, the Albanian government continued to support the diplomacy 
by offering to NATO full cooperation. Albania allowed NATO airplanes to fly over 
Albanian territory and, as it had for IFOR in the Bosnian action, placed its international 
airport and military airfields at NATO’s disposal.108  
 NATO deployed about 8,000 troops in Albania to assist the country to manage the 
humanitarian crises caused by more than 200,000 Kosovo Refugees who crossed the 
border to escape the Milosevic’s regime’s annhilatory oppression.109 The operation 
provided security for the international agencies and organizations that were engaged with 
delivering aid for refugees, “provided assistance in logistics, transport, infrastructure and 
coordination, based on the demands of the Albanian government."110  
4.      Albanian–NATO Relations during Kosovo Crisis 
 After exhausting all diplomatic means, NATO commenced Operation Allied 
Force (OAF, March–June 1999), which successfully compelled Milosevic’s regime to 
stop the ethnic cleansing, withdraw the troops from Kosovo, and allow for a 
peacekeeping force to be deployed in Kosovo to guarantee the return of refugees to their 
homes. After the 78-day air campaign, Kosovo Force (KFOR), with about 50,000 troops 
from NATO and partner countries, deployed to Kosovo on 12 June 1999. (KFOR was a 
peace enforcement operation based on a mandate from UNSCR 1244 dated 10 June 
1999.) Today KFOR’s 10,000-troop presence in Kosovo continues to serve as 
“deterrence” to Serbia.111  “KFOR’s presence has been crucial in maintaining safety and 
security for all individuals and communities in Kosovo. Today, KFOR continues to 
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contribute toward maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo for the benefit of 
all citizens.”112  The relative stability of Kosovo also benefits Albania in terms of both 
immigration and the situation of the ethnic Albanians there.   
 At the end of Operation Allied Force, in August 1999, NATO established 
Communication Zone West (COMMZ (W)), as its presence with a specific mission in 
Albania. The Headquarters was integrated into the structure of the KFOR and had a 
Multinational Military Force from the USA, Germany, France, Turkey and Greece. The 
COMMZ (W) was tasked with securing the lines of communications from Albania to 
Kosovo and south from Albania to Macedonia, the port of Durres and Rinas International 
Airport. However, one important mission of COMMZ (W) was “to maintain working 
links between NATO and Albania.”113  
 NATO assistance to Albania after the 1997 domestic crises, its undisputable role 
in resolving the crises in Kosovo, and its presence in Albania during refugee crises and 
thereafter increased the public support for Euro-Atlantic aspiration in unprecedented 
levels. One professor on the University of Tirana put it in this way: “There is a great 
openness toward NATO. People have been hopeless, and they are reading very positive 
signs into the buildup."114 According to Preç Zogaj, a senior adviser to Rexhep Mejdani, 
the Albanian President of that time, the presence of the alliance in Albania “demanded 
responsibility from Albania's politicians, curtailing their penchant for instigating unrest 
and accelerating internal reforms that will improve policing and immigration controls.”115 
Prime Minister Majko said solemnly:  
The presence of NATO troops in Albania, their role in the resolution of 
the conflict in Kosova and the aid they have provided for the rehabilitation 
of the infrastructure Albania have brought back to the people the optimism 
that the country has now a future, it has partners and worthy allies…116 
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NATO stood side-by-side my people and my people lined themselves 
totally by the side of NATO in the role of an equal partner in this in 
gigantic battle, one of the biggest in the history of mankind.117 
In 2001 NATO played an important role in resolving the nine-month 
conflict that erupted in Macedonia between ethnic Albanians and ethnic 
Macedonians in 2001. Although the EU was engaged actively in hammering out 
the Ohrid Framework Agreement that ended the conflict, NATO’s intervention 
was essential to demilitarize the National Liberation Army (NLA) and to collect 
and destroy their weapons. Mainly because the alliance had gained legitimacy and 
trust with its consistent and clear engagements to provide peace and stability in 
Balkans, first with intervention in Bosnia and then in Kosovo, NATO could 
influence this delicate task and, once again, help restore stability to the region. 
 NATO’S ROLE IN PREVENTING THE EMERGENCE OF ISLAMIC C.
TERRORISM IN ALBANIA 
NATO’s efforts in and around Albania also helped curtail the allure of Islamist 
extremism and other forms of terrorism in the fledgling Balkan democracy. The anti-west 
ideologies advanced by extremist religious groups were not successful because Albanians 
embraced liberal democratic values and imagined their future integrated in the Euro-
Atlantic Community.118 Particularly the crucial role that NATO played in ending the 
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and in resolving ethnic strife in Macedonia fostered a 
resolutely pro-NATO (and, hence, pro-Western) public attitude in Albania. Both strong 
political and public orientation toward NATO, while easing the socialization and 
cooperation with the West, made it difficult for terrorist groups to rely on the Albanian 
Muslim population for their terrorist acts against American or Western targets.  
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Furthermore, NATO engagement in Kosovo and Macedonia not only boosted 
public support for the Euro-Atlantic alliance but also thwarted the involvement of 
Mujahidin fighters in the conflict for two reasons. First, the engagement of the West to 
stop the oppression of Muslims prevented the interpretation of the conflicts as religious 
wars. The NATO operations in ex-Yugoslavia were exercised “in support building 
institutions of good governance in central and Eastern Europe.”119 The allies were united 
in acting in accordance with shared liberal democratic values in order to stop the massive 
humanitarian crisis in Balkans. Thus the armed struggle of both KLA and NLA 
maintained their secular setting and did not embark on a religious war. Second, the 
potential support of mujahidin could not be compared with the military capabilities that 
NATO engaged in Kosovo crises. Both KLA and NLA leaders made it clear that they 
fought for the rights of Albanians and not for a religious cause.120 They distanced 
themselves from terrorist groups and were eager to deny any alleged connections with 
them. They fully cooperated with NATO and were grateful to NATO for helping their 
cause.  
Next, Albania’s aspiration for Euro-Atlantic integration created on incentive for 
the Albanian government to give a free hand to United States to fight terrorism in 
Albania.121 In 1998–1999, the Albanian government, in close cooperation with the 
American CIA, cracked down on terrorist cells and groups operating in Albania with 
suspected links to terrorists. Albania also has been able to deport suspected Islamic 
extremists and terrorists. On 18 April 1999, in Egypt took part one of the biggest terrorist 
trials in history. “The trial involved 107 Islamic fundamentalists, 63 of whom were tried 
in absentia. Most of the accused belonged to the Egyptian al-Jihad group, while the most 
notorious had ties to Osama bin Ladin’s al-Qaidah organization.”122 The trial has been 
called the “trial of the returnees from Albanian,” because “twenty of the accused were 
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extradited from Albania in July of ‘98.”123 The trial revealed a lot of information about 
the organization, links and plans of the terrorist groups. At the same time the 
determination of Albania to capture and hand over the alleged terrorist was a clear sign to 
terrorist organizations that Albania could not consider a safe haven any longer.  
Last, NATO’s presence and active engagement in defense institution building 
helped Albania overcome the difficult security situation created by the internal crises of 
1997. NATO assisted Albania to store properly the munitions and to dispose the 
excessive amount of munitions that threatened to create a breach in the security of the 
country. NATO’s positive engagement increased the faith of the people in the democratic 
reforms and in the national institutions, boosting the hope of the people for a future in the 
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III. THE ROADMAP TO NATO INTEGRATION 
This chapter analyzes NATO-Albanian relation beginning from 1999, when 
Albania joined the (MAP), until 2008, when Albania was invited to join the Alliance at 
the Bucharest Summit. This period of time is characterized by an intensification of 
relations between NATO and Albania. The major foreign policy objective, NATO 
integration, became the word of the day, meaning that it influenced and guided 
government plans and programs. In this phase, Albania made painstaking efforts to leave 
behind its image as a security consumer and to emerge as a reliable partner contributing 
to the regional and broader security.  
In the early 2000s, Albania developed the first National Security Strategy, which 
was followed by the Military Strategy. These two important documents emphasized 
collective defense and guided Albanian defense reforms toward a small, professional and 
deployable military force able to participate in or support NATO operations. The 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States and the strong reaction of 
the Alliance to international terrorism represented a strategic chance for Albania to align 
itself with NATO. Albania committed itself to fight actively international terrorism both 
domestically and abroad. NATO-Albanian relations intensified, and cooperation against 
fighting terrorism became an important point. Albania’s participation in ISAF increased 
until it became the biggest contributor compared to the population. In addition, Albania 
strongly supported the so-called “coalition of the willing” in Iraq and participated in 
Operation Active Endeavour.  
In the domestic realm, Albania undertook such effective measures from the 
Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism as improving border control; destroying small 
weapons and excessive ammunition, which Albania had in over-abundance; improving 
the legal framework to prevent money laundering and to comply with international 
conventions against terrorism; and fighting organized crime and corruption.  
This chapter explores the regional policy of Albania as a very important feature of 
the Euro-Atlantic integration. The chapter concludes with an assessment of NATO-
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Albanian relations at the eve of Bucharest Summit, when Albania was invited officially 
to join the Alliance. 
       ALBANIA JOINS MAP A.
The Membership Action Plan was launched in April 1999 at the Washington 
Summit to assist democratizing states in Europe to meet NATO membership in criteria 
by providing advice, assistance, and practical support in all fields.124 Although the 
invitation to join MAP does not necessarily guarantee NATO accession, the process helps 
aspiring countries to identify objectives and develop individual annual national programs 
tailored to their needs covering a wide range of areas—political, economic, defense, 
resource, security and legal.125 The individual annual national program is reviewed and 
progress is assessed by the alliance, which, by the same mechanism, provides political 
and technical advice. Furthermore, MAP is a clearing house which helps coordinate 
assistance by NATO and member states to aspiring countries.126  
Albania was one of the first nine countries that were invited to join MAP in the 
Washington Summit in 1999. Albania took MAP very seriously and developed 10 cycles 
ANP that guided the reforms and the transformation of Albania until the invitation to start 
accession talks in Bucharest Summit in 2008.127  The annual national plans reflected 
Albanian aspirations to build a solid democratic and constitutional state based on the rule 
of law and a free market economy. They aimed at conducting reforms to consolidate the 
democratic institutions while declaring open war on organized crime and corruption. 
Particular emphasis fell on continuing the defense sector reforms in order to establish 
democratic civilian control over the military and to prepare the Albanian Armed Forces 
to join the Alliance. The ANPs also stressed the importance of good relations with the 
neighbors, and the regional cooperation to foster peace and stability. The programs 
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emphasized that “the strategic goal of the country is its full integration into Euro-Atlantic 
structures128 asserting Albania’s commitment to take active part in peace support 
operations and the fight against international terrorism.129  
Because the MAP process covered such a wide spectrum of reforms, it required 
the contribution and the coordination of efforts among several different institutions. The 
Ministry of Defense (MoD), the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Ministry of Interior 
(MoI), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), were closely involved in the MAP 
process, coordinating regularly through an interagency working group. In 2000, a new 
directorate, responsible for developing Defense Policies for Euro-Atlantic Integration, 
was established at the Ministry of Defense. This directorate played a major role in setting 
integration objectives for the Armed Forces. An inter-ministerial committee on Euro-
Atlantic integration, chaired by the prime minister, was established to oversee the MAP 
process. 130 MAP objectives were embedded in all governmental plans and programs. 
Parliament also was active in the process, which enabled the passing of a huge body of 
laws aimed at the harmonization of national legislation with NATO.  
The MAP process helped Albania to identify the right integration objectives and 
improve plans based on the allies’ feedback and consultation.  Kristaq Gerveni, the 
Director of Planning Directorate at the Albanian General Staff from 2003 to 2005, argues 
that Albania made very good use of the consultation mechanism with the alliance.131 
Indeed, Albania was the first partner country to employ political consultation with NATO 
during Kosovo crises. This step accorded completely with the spirit of the alliance, which 
emphasized political consultation as one of the most important drivers of the alliance. 
Since then, Albania has used consultation extensively to fulfill integration objectives. For 
example the MAP 2000–2001 included consultation with NATO on political, military, 
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resource and legal issues, including political consultation for the post-Kosovo conflict 
regional situation, political consultation on the Macedonian ethnic conflict with ethnic 
Albanians in 2001, continuing military consultation on the transformation of the Albanian 
Armed Forces, and the consultation on the harmonization of the national legal framework 
with NATO. 132 
 DEVELOPPING THE STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS  B.
In 2000, Albania developed its first National Security Strategy (NSS). The 
document, in sharp contrast to the previous defense policies of the communist regime, 
was open and public. It also was oriented toward collective defense rather than focusing 
on individual national defense. The strategy identified the risks and threats to the national 
security in line with the threats perceived by NATO.133  The strategy outlined, above all, 
extremist nationalism, political instability, organized crime, and WMD as the main 
threats to the national security. The same document stated that the rule of law, 
consolidation of democratic institutions, Euro-Atlantic and EU integration were crucial to 
national security.  
The NSS stated that Albania did not have territorial disputes, had no enemies, and 
made no claims to redraw borders, but, instead, firmly believed that regional cooperation 
was needed to achieve peace and stability.134 These arguments “determined Albania as a 
factor which ‘produces and exports security’ through the implementation of good 
neighborhood policy and regional dialogue.”135 The 2000 NSS was developed in a 
difficult time—right after the curtailment of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, whose status 
remained still unresolved, and on the eve of the eruption of the ethnic conflict in 
Macedonia, which involved ethnic Albanians. However, the NSS, framed by NATO-
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Albania political consultation, did not resort to individual measures to tackle the national 
security challenges. The NSS claimed no border disputes and advocated dialogue and 
regional cooperation as the only way to resolve disputes with neighbor countries.  
Not surprisingly, the strategy identified terrorism as an important security threat 
not only to the international community but also to Albania itself, and it touted regional 
and international cooperation as the proper way to fight the organized crime, to achieve 
internal stability in order to deny terrorists the safe haven in Albania.136 The strategy also 
acknowledged NATO’s presence in the Balkans and southeastern Europe as very 
important for the peace and stability of the region. Ultimately, the 2000 NSS adopted 
NATO’s security concept and signaled Albania’s intent to reinvent itself as a “security 
provider” in the region and in the alliance. 
In 2002 Albania adopted its first military strategy, completing the legal-
documentary framework for the national defense. The military strategy was developed in 
line with NATO’s country standards and in “full accordance” with the NATO’s 1999 
Strategic Concept.137 The strategy articulated three main goals for the defense reform: 
first, to become a full professional army by year 2010; second, to create small but capable 
military force to defend the country and at the same time to be deployed in support of 
NATO operations; and third, to increase the defense budget every year by 0.1 percent of 
GDP in order to reach NATO requirement of 2 percent of GDP by 2010.  The military 
strategy listed among the most important threats organized crime and terrorism, 
acknowledging the threat they pose to the state and its democratic institutions.138 The 
military strategy 2002 denationalized defense by identifying and addressing the common 
threats, departing farther from the individual self-defense concept. 
The NSS of 2004, called also “the strategy of integration,” was focused 
thoroughly on the integration of Albania into the Euro-Atlantic structures as one of the 
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two pillars of Albania’s diplomacy—the other being the EU integration. It lays out the 
transformation of Albania from security consumer to security provider. The strategy 
believes that “the level of the security of the country will be fostered by successfully 
accomplishing the programs and standards of PfP and Agreement of Stabilization and 
Association.”139 The strategy states that the national issue will be achieved through Euro-
Atlantic integration.140  
The NSS of 2004 has been criticized by security experts on the basis that it is a 
strategy of NATO integration rather than a pure national security strategy. The critiques 
go on to suggest that defense and security reform in Albania is driven by external actors 
mainly through the consultation mechanism, such as MAP, and prioritizes meeting 
NATO military standards rather than fulfilling Albania’s security environment 
requirements or national interests.141 However, the critics proposed no other alternative. 
Indeed, Albania was not able to maintain a big army, able to defend its national interest in 
the region and assert itself as a regional power. On the other hand, Albania’s vital 
national interests were being threatened by the regional instability. Albania could have 
been dragged in a regional war full of nationalist sentiments, similar to post 1990 ethnic 
wars in ex-Yugoslavia, which would have ruined the country and the region. Considering 
the weak position of Albania, the internal political instability, weak economy, limited 
military power and regional instability Albanian national interest were much better 
realized according to this strategy of integration.142 By replacing nationalism with 
integration, the hostility with cooperation, individual action with political consultation 
with NATO Albania showed maturity, reliability and emerged as a regional factor to the 
stability. By becoming part of the solution it had better chances to be heard in the 
international domain therefore to advocate its national interest. 
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 ALBANIA AND NATO AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS  C.
The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, were 
perceived as an assault on democratic values and principles the over world. In the 1999 
Strategic Concept, NATO had already identified terrorism as a potential risk that could 
affect the security interests of the alliance.143 However, the unimagined scale of the 
terrorist attacks, the superb international coordination, and the determination of terrorist 
organization to destroy democratic order put the fight against terrorism very high in 
NATO’s agenda.   
“On the evening of 12 September 2001, less than 24 hours after the attacks, and 
for the first time in NATO's history, the Allies invoked Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty, the Alliance’s collective defense clause.”144 On the same day, government leaders 
of NATO candidate states, the "Vilnius 10"145 group, condemned the terrorist attacks 
against the U.S. and vowed to “undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of 
terrorism.”146 The document that was endorsed in the EAPC meeting “underscored that 
the terrorist attack was directed not only against one country but also against all nations 
supporting freedom, democracy and global security.”147  
Albania, as part of the Vilnius Group, joined the EU countries in proclaiming 
September 14 a National Day of Mourning. On September 28, the Albanian Parliament 
adopted unanimously a resolution that firmly condemned the terrorist attacks in the U.S. 
soil. The resolution declared Albania’s full support in the campaign against the terrorism 
and offered the use of Albania’s entire airspace, ports and airport facilities to the anti-
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terrorism coalition.148 Similarly, on 5 October at the Sofia Summit, the President of the 
Republic, Rexhep Meidani, declared that Albania was ready to cooperate with NATO, 
the United States, and the EU in the fight against terrorism; the country, acting as a 
“defacto member of the alliance, puts at the disposal of the anti-terrorism coalition its 
land, maritime and areal space.”149 In addition, Albanian Prime Minister Ilir Meta 
declared:  
[The] Albanian government fully supports the U.S. and British attacks 
against terrorist bases and infrastructure in Afghanistan as well as against 
the Taliban regime that supported terrorism. The Albanian government 
states once more that it has committed to the antiterrorist campaign all of 
its assets, but above all its political will and determination to stand firmly 
and permanently in support of Freedom and Democracy, civilization and 
progress.150  
At a meeting of the EAPC held on December 2001, Foreign Minister Arta Dade 
stated that Albania considered the attacks against the United States “as an attack against 
values Albania stands for.” Besides making the military infrastructure available for the 
anti-terrorist coalition, the foreign minister declared the availability of 500 special troops 
to be used eventually in counter terrorist operations—a significant promise made by a 
small country with very limited resources. However, the strategic importance of this 
promise far exceeded the military capabilities that it offered. It showed clearly a firm 
political consensus and will across the Albanian political forces and strong support by the 
public to contribute militarily to the collective defense of the values for which the 
alliance stands. This willingness is in fact what NATO was seeking from those countries 
seeking membership.   
In the brief outline of the initial measures taken from the Republic of Albania in 
the framework of the action against terrorism, then Foreign Minister Dade noted that 
Albania will follow the fight against the international terrorism “in all its complexity, 
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political, juridical, military and economic aspects.”151 She reassured the EAPC that the 
Albanian government was committed to “maximally increas[ing] its efforts to strengthen 
Albania's border control and to identify and prevent depositing, circulating, or 
transferring money by the foundations or individuals financing the terrorist actions 
exercise continuous control on bank assets.” She aptly pointed out the nexus that exists 
between organized crime and terrorism and stated that the fight against organized crime 
and illegal trafficking “assumes a special importance under the new circumstance.” She 
concluded that “fighting these threats is a must for the nations that aspire to freedom and 
democracy.” 152 
Indeed, the Albanian government acted quickly to take steps to bolster anti-
terrorist activities. For example, the Central Bank of Albania within one month from the 
terrorist attacks established a working group to investigate the possible presence of bank 
assets belonging to persons related to terrorist activities. In October 2001, five foreign 
citizens suspected of terrorist connections and several others were expelled from the 
Albanian territory.153  
In January 2002, the Albanian Parliament approved and enacted the National Plan 
against Terrorism to coordinate and bolter interagency efforts to fight terrorism in all 
realms. The plan was prepared by an inter-ministerial working group under the lead of 
the Ministry of Defense.  
Many experts in the field aptly have criticized the engagement of the Ministry of 
Defense in leading positions, particularly in the planning aspect, while the Ministry of 
Interior is the ministry carrying out the most responsibilities.154 However, it can be 
argued that the leading role of Ministry of Defense has two reasonable explanations. 
First, it has a symbolic value. By giving the leading role to the MoD, the government 
elevated the importance of the fight against terrorism to the level of the national defense. 
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Second, it was an organizational choice. The Ministry of Defense, thanks to NATO 
assistance, was by far more organized, reformed, and functional than the other ministries, 
especially the Ministry of Interior (called Ministry of Public Order), which at that time 
was struggling with reforms to fight corruption and to increase effectiveness.  
The plan identified two main categories of terrorism: domestic and international. 
Domestic terrorism, which aims to destabilize the state and hamper the democratic 
transition, is further divided into two subcategories: terrorist acts executed in Albania by 
Albanian citizens supported by domestic forces and terrorist acts perpetrated by Albanian 
citizens supported by foreign forces. The plan divides international terrorism into two 
subcategories, too: terrorist acts perpetrated by foreigners in Albania and terrorist 
activities abroad perpetrated by Albanian citizens recruited by international terrorist 
organizations. Although the plan noted that no terrorist acts pertaining to the international 
terrorism category had been recorded yet, it drew attention to the potential threat of 
international terrorism based on the fact that from 1990 to 2000 the borders of Albania 
have been poorly controlled.  
The plan aimed not only to bring counterterrorism measures to Western standards 
but also to improve the image of Albania in support of Euro-Atlantic integration. In the 
wake of the Prague Summit,155 where NATO was expected to extend membership 
invitations to some of the candidate countries, Albania could not afford to be accused 
from some foreign media of being a safe haven for terrorist activities.  
And these accusations were floated at the time, mostly by the Serbian and 
Macedonian intelligence services.  The gist was that Tirana, in addition to being unable to 
control its borders and terrorist activities inside the country, was supporting Albanian 
terrorists operating outside Albania. Although such allegations were never proved, the 
Albanian government was concerned that they “appear to be accepted at face value in the 
West, where influential media echo[d] the allegations that Albania poses an Islamic threat 
to Europe.”156 Albania feared that its religious composition, dominated by a Muslim 
                                                 
155 NATO Summit held in Prague in November, 21–22, 2002. 
156 “Bin Laden and the Balkans: The Politics of Anti-Terrorism,” ICG Balkans, Report N° 1199 
November 2001, 9. 
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majority, could be used not only by religious fundamentalists to extend their influence on 
the region but also by some neighbor countries that might want to portray Albania as a 
country that harbors, trains and supports terrorists.157   
As much as Albanian solidarity with its strategic ally,158 this sensitivity to the 
reality and the perceptions of Albania’s status as a Muslim-majority polity in Europe 
begins to explain the Albanian government’s “overzealous efforts to eradicate all 
fundamentalist Islamic influences from the country” ensuring that no terrorist cell can 
operate from Albanian soil.159 Yet, another reason is that Albania feared that any horrible 
terrorist acts would shift the attention of the West from the problems of small nations, 
such as Albania. Thus, in order to “prevent abandonment” from the West, national efforts 
were needed to improve the internal stability and security and embark on the same boat 
with the Allies in order to emerge as a reliable partner, which hopefully would accelerate 
the integration process.160 NATO, through a statement regarding Balkans released at the 
Brussels Defense Ministers’ NAC meeting, had made it clear that it “will ensure that 
NATO forces continue to pursue, within their current mandates and capabilities, actions 
against persons suspected to be terrorists, in coordination with appropriate civil 
authorities and other international organizations. The Alliance will remain engaged with 
local authorities to ensure that the region does not become a safe haven or way station for 
terrorist.”161 
At the same year, the KFOR COMMZ (W) was transformed into the NATO HQ 
Tirana, commanded by a Senior Military Representative who reported directly to the 
Commander Allied Joint Force Command Naples.162 NATO HQ Tirana’s mission was to 
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facilitate the coordination between the Albanian government and NATO and to assist 
Albania in the implementation of defense reforms geared toward future NATO 
membership. NATO HQ Tirana was deeply involved in many reforms and defense issues, 
providing advice, expertise, and assistance. Of particular note are their efforts to 
coordinate border control measures with the involvement of many agencies, their 
assistance and advice on Partnership Goals (PG), MAP, and ANPs, and on other defense- 
and integration-related issues. The cooperation between NHQ Tirana and the Ministry of 
Defense developed to a point that the NATO HQ representatives became permanent 
participants in MoD meetings.  
This close coordination was doubly important. First, Albania was making 
excellent use of NATO’s assistance and expertise by engaging its representatives in a 
wide variety of defense related issues. Second, NATO’s involvement in depth with 
Albanian defense issues not only increased the transparency and the mutual trust between 
the MoD and the alliance but also provided the allies with a clear understanding of the 
problems and genuine efforts of Albanians in their path toward integration. Last, but not 
least NATO HQ Tirana had an outstanding Civil Military Cooperation CIMIC program, 
which included activities in support of the civilian population and which improved 
further the positive image of NATO in Albania.163 
Following the national policy for the maximal engagement and support to the 
Worldwide Anti-Terrorism coalition, in August 2002, Albania sent a Special Forces 
Platoon to Afghanistan. Participation of this contingent in the ISAF framework had full 
support from all political parties and the public opinion in Albania.164 The personnel of 
this force were capable, trained, prepared, equipped and motivated to achieve the mission 
successfully. They served under the Turkish forces in Kabul, and their main missions 
were to provide base security and escorts. 
                                                 
163 From 2002–2005 NATO HQ Tirana was involved in different activities in support of Civilian 
population in Albania such as providing air lift capabilities to transport food and medicines to the Northern 
Parts of Albania that were trapped by the bad weather, providing assistance to improve the local 
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164 Ministry of Defense, MAP: Annual National Programs of the Republic of Albania 1999–2005 
(Tirana: Military Press and Publication Center, 2004), 69–136. 
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The decision of Albania to be part of ISAF without delay was consistent with 
Albanian foreign policy goals and the integration strategy. Certainly, the participation in 
ISAF was associated with many political risks and economic and social costs. First of all, 
there was the matter of Albania’s Muslim majority. The ISAF operation was somehow 
different from the missions in Bosnia or Kosovo, where NATO was perceived as the 
protector of the rights of Muslim populations. ISAF was involved in fighting against the 
Muslim Taliban, which might have ramified within the Islamic community, especially if 
it were being radicalized. This is to say that at best, Albanian support for NATO 
integration could have decreased and at worst Albania could find itself a target of 
terrorism to be compelled to withdraw from the coalition. Moreover, ISAF involved 
greater risks in terms of casualties than the other Peace Support Operations PSOs in 
which Albania was participating.  
Next, the participation in ISAF came at the moment when Albanian military was 
undergoing deep reforms with a very limited defense budget.165 ISAF diverted valuable 
resources from modernization and reconstruction programs, not to mention the other 
pressing socioeconomic needs of the nation. Last but not least, the participation in ISAF 
could have resulted in total failure of the mission and national embarrassment, showing 
that Albania was not capable of providing military capabilities to the alliance. Taking into 
consideration the total disintegration of the army only five years ago, this concern too 
was entirely at that moment. However, Albanian government firmly decided to continue 
to pursue its major objective, Euro-Atlantic integration, aptly assessing that the benefits 
of participation in ISAF would outweigh the costs associated with it. Indeed, the cohesion 
of all political elites, the public attitude, NATO’s assistance, and the outstanding efforts 
of the Albanian military would make ISAF participation in the coming years Albania’s 
biggest PSO.   
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1.      The Prague Summit 
Despite its enthusiastic and energetic approach to NATO integration, Albania was 
not invited to join the alliance at the Prague Summit 2002. As Albanian President Alfred 
Moisu acknowledged later: 
We are aware, however, that we will not be invited to join NATO simply 
because of the level of public support for Alliance membership or for our 
contribution to NATO-led peacekeeping operations. Rather, when we are 
invited to join the Alliance, it will be in recognition of much hard work and the 
successful conclusion of a long and comprehensive reform process to bring our 
standards in line with those of the Alliance.166   
According to Moisu, “Albania's historical political and economic under-development, 
internal instability and wider conflict in Southeastern Europe undermined our 
membership aspirations at the Prague Summit.”167  
The Prague Summit did not discourage Albania, however. On the contrary, it 
bolstered Albanian efforts to meet political, economic and military membership criteria. 
By inviting seven other aspiring countries to assume full membership,168 NATO showed 
Albania that its enlargement policy was not merely rhetoric but an achievable objective 
connected to fulfillment of membership criteria. Furthermore, at the Prague Summit, 
Albania was commended for “its significant reform progress, its constructive role in 
promoting regional stability, and strong support for the Alliance,” and was encouraged to 
“redouble their reform efforts” because together with Croatia and Macedonia it 
“remained under consideration for future membership.”169  
Secretary General Lord Robertson reinforced this message during his visit to 
Tirana just after the Prague Summit in November 2002. He stressed that the “latest wave 
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 57 
of expansion would not be the last,” and Albania “must do more to improve border 
security and stop the free movement of criminals and traffickers.”170 With such 
encouraging words, NATO provided further incentive for Albania to continue vigorously 
pursuing its reforms. Prime Minister Fatos Nano said that the Albanian government 
understood that “in order to fully meet NATO's membership criteria it should continue 
doing its "homework" and he hoped to achieve this "over the next three years."171 
In addition to the successful round of enlargement, the Prague Summit was also 
important for the documents that were adopted related to the new security environment: 
the Prague Capabilities Commitment,172 a Military Concept for the Defense against 
Terrorism and the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism.   
The Military Concept emphasizes the real threat that the allies face from terrorism 
and draws attention to the point that any response would be time critical. Thus it suggests 
member nations have “the primary responsibility for defense of their populations and 
infrastructures, so the Alliance should be prepared to augment nations' efforts.”173 The 
concept identifies four roles for NATO's military operations against terrorism: anti- 
terrorism, which includes basically defensive measures from terrorist acts; consequence 
management; counterterrorism, which includes primarily offensive measures; and 
military cooperation.  The military concept urges NATO to “be ready to conduct military 
operations to engage terrorist groups and their capabilities, as and where required, as 
decided by the North Atlantic Council.”174 It showed that the fight against terrorism 
would be one of NATO’s top priorities for the coming years.  
In addition, the alliance bolstered its cooperation with partners in the fight against 
terrorism by launching the Partner Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T). The 
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Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T) is an important part of PfP 
framework that uses political consultation and a wide variety of activities.175 The PAP-T 
accords with fundamental freedoms and human rights, as well as upholding the rule of 
law in combating terrorism.176   
2.       The Istanbul Summit  
The summit declaration welcomed the progress made by Albania implementing 
the MAP, especially its contribution to regional stability and cooperation. NATO 
reassured Albania that the door to membership would remained open and “encouraged it 
to continue pursuing the reforms necessary to progress towards NATO membership.   
The Istanbul Summit 2004 stressed even more the resolve of the alliance to fight 
the international terrorism. At this summit, NATO adopted a package of measures, to 
include improving intelligence sharing; increasing counter-terrorism cooperation through 
NATO's partnerships; enhancing capabilities to defend against terrorism and robust 
engagement in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Alliance was committed to continue “the 
robust efforts in the Balkans to help create conditions in which terrorism cannot flourish 
until peace and security were e firmly established and the progressive integration of all 
Balkan countries into Euro-Atlantic structures was achieved.”177 
 IMPROVING INTERNAL SECURITY AS A PATH TO NATO D.
The PAP-T, in reality, was a simple plan that, among other measures, put focus on 
improving the internal security of partner countries as a measure to impede support for 
terrorist groups. While Albania has never been a source of terrorist activities abroad, or a 
target of them, the fragile internal security increased the concern of NATO that Albania 
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might become a safe haven for terrorism. The geographic position of Albania, at the 
crossroads of West and East, coupled with weak borders control, weak state institutions, 
and consolidated organized crime, made it a favorable transitory place to all kinds of 
illegal traffics.  
“Since 1992, ethnic Albanian organized crime groups have profited greatly from 
instability and war in the Balkans to become the fastest growing ethnic criminal presence 
in Europe. With operations reaching as far as Australia and the United States, Albanian 
groups are the direct distributors of an estimated 40 percent of heroin in West European 
markets and may have an indirect role in as much more.”178 Other criminal undertakings 
included illegal immigration from Albania, Eastern Europe and Asia, human trafficking 
and illegal arms trade. “The illegal arms trade has been fed by an estimated 550,000 
military weapons, nearly 1 billion rounds of ammunition, and 16 million explosive 
devices that were removed from military stockpiles during the rioting of 1997.”179 
NATO noted with particular concern the nexus between organized crime and 
extremism in the region. The alliance believed that fighting organized crime and 
providing effective border control and surveillance was the key of the door to Euro-
Atlantic integration and to the development of prosperous and democratic stability.180 
NATO throughout its partnership mechanisms such as MAP, PfP, IPP assisted in 
identifying, planning and addressing these challenges accordingly respecting the rule of 
law. 
1.  Smalls Arms and Light Weapons Destruction 
Albania and NATO began to cooperate closely on the destruction of the small 
arms, light weapons, and stockpiles of ammunition. Albania had inherited from the 
period of communist regime 194,000 tons ammunition, distributed in 182 regions and 
stored in 955 depots all around the country. The military reforms in post-communist 
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Albania decreased the numbers of military units, ammunition depots, and personnel so 
the ammunition stockpile was stored in fewer depots, sometimes exceeding their storage 
capacities and breaching the standards of safety. Meanwhile, fewer guards stood duty 
amid the draw-downs. At the same time, the ammunition was fast approaching the end of 
its shelf life, making it increasingly unstable and dangerous to military personnel and the 
surrounding communities.181 Inventory of the stockpiles had become difficult, leading to 
unaccounted fire arms and ammunition that might end up in the hands of organized 
criminals or terrorists. 
The looting of a large amount of fire arms and ammunition during the civil unrest 
in 1997 complicated the situation even more. “Around 550,000 military weapons, nearly 
1 billion rounds of ammunition, and 16 million explosive devices were removed from 
military stockpiles during the rioting of 1997 which potentially might have fed the illegal 
traffic of arms”182 In the end, the Albanian government managed to reclaim a 
considerable amount of the errant weapons and ammunition, which still  had to be 
accounted for.  
In 2000, NATO established the PfP Trust Fund to assist PfP countries with the 
safe destruction of stocks of anti-personnel landmines.183 Albania was the first country to 
take advantage of this initiative. In 2001, under a tailored PfP Trust Fund project, NATO 
provided the financial resources and technological training necessary to help Albania 
destroy its anti-personnel mine stockpile. The project was directed and managed by 
NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) and included the cleanup of 
territories bordering Kosovo that had been littered with anti-personnel land mines during 
the Kosovo conflict and the destruction of stockpiled land mines. The project was a real 
success, destroying 1.6 million anti-personnel land mines.  
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Stemming from this success, the scope of the NATO/PfP Trust Fund Policy was 
expanded to include the destruction of small arms, light weapons, and surplus 
munitions.184 Under NAMSA’s management and with the financial assistance of allied 
countries, the period 2004–2007 saw the destruction of 11,500 tons of SALWs.185 These 
projects helped Albania “achieve a high-degree of self-sufficiency in explosive ordnance 
disposal and ammunition management.”186 This experience also made Albania one of the 
leading nations in the process of demilitarization with extensive expertise to offer to other 
countries. In fact, the demilitarization plan foresees that in 2013, Albania will have 
destroyed it entire excess munitions stockpile.  
2.  The First Country in the World without Chemical Weapons  
In December 2002, some 16 tons of chemical agents that had belonged to the 
military during the communist regime came to light. The existence of these dangerous 
chemical agents has been unknown to the post-communist military leadership until their 
discovery. Albania quickly revealed the presence of thee chemical agents in its territory, 
and took strict measures to store and guard the material.  It also sought international 
assistance to destroy them.  
The United States was prompt to offer cooperation and assistance for the disposal 
of the dangerous materials. In 2004, under the Nunn Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program, the United States assisted Albania to realize the safe disposal of the entire 
amount of chemical agents turning Albania to be the first country in the world without 
chemical weapons.   
3.  Border Security and Illegal Trafficking  
Because of its maritime proximity to Italy, Albania became “the starting-point for 
one of the world's busiest illegal-immigration routes.” The smugglers used fast boats to 
traffic human beings, illegal immigration, weapons, drugs, contraband goods, etc. into 
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Italy and the EU. Illegal immigration was such a normal activity in the early 2000s that 
the soon-to-be illegal immigrants boarded the fast boats near city centers as if they were 
merely going aboard a water taxi or a tour boat.187 On the other hand, these activities 
generated incomes in a very poor country with a high unemployment rate. 
Achieving the border security was important to improve the image of the country 
and convince NATO that Albania could contribute in the regional security. The campaign 
against international terrorism gave a certain impetus to improving border security. In 
November 2001, the council of ministers approved a National Strategy against the illegal 
trafficking of human beings. It identified the ways and means to prevent the illegal 
traffic. Albania sought closer cooperation among the countries of the region, believing 
that illegal trafficking represents a regional concern that demands a regional approach. At 
the end of 2001, in Vlora, the epicenter of illegal traffic in Albania, the International 
Center for Combatting Illegal Trafficking (ICCIT) was established with the participation 
of Germany, Italy, and Greece.188  
NATO’s strict position on Border Security urged reforms, institutional 
transformation and interagency cooperation to ensure the border security. The 
transformation of the NAVY is a case in point. In 2002, the Albanian Navy assumed the 
mission of a coast guard. The Navy developed a web of memoranda of understanding 
with all the institutions that have interests at sea, establishing for the first time a 
coordinated plan to enforce the law at sea. It is important to note that the Navy was the 
first armed service to adapt to the new security challenges. In 2004, the Navy together 
with the other state agencies conducted its most successful operation to date, called 
“PUNA.” During this operation, more than a dozen fast boats were intercepted or 
destroyed and some key criminals were arrested. Although it is unrealistic to claim that 
the illegal traffic was completely stopped, the operation was important not only for doing 
considerable damage to the international network but also for increasing the confidence 
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of the state agencies and proving that interagency cooperation was key to law 
enforcement at sea. 
Border security was further enhanced by the acceptance of the counterterrorism-
related Partnership Goals (PG)s that were included in the PG package Albania accepted 
in 2004.  PGs are interoperability objectives accepted by the partner country in order to 
develop capabilities that can be used to support or to be integrated with NATO forces.189 
Although the objectives are voluntary, they are important because first of all they test the 
commitment of the partner country to provide contribution in the alliance. PGs are 
included in the PARP process, which is similar to the NATO planning process, and the 
implementation progress is monitored closely. The PGs required that by 2006, all border 
patrol and coast guard vessels surveillance equipment be modernized, the personnel be 
trained to conduct boarding operations properly and a Communication & Information 
(CI) System be in place and able to share information with national and international 
security agencies.190 In 2007, all these objectives were declared implemented. 
The Navy embarked on a transformation plan that aimed to adapt to the concept 
“One Navy, two missions.”191 Accordingly, the Navy’s tasks increased, including among 
them the fight against terrorism, the fight against illegal trafficking, illegal immigration, 
search and rescue, etc. The plan foresaw the replacement of heavy gunned naval ships 
with new, fast, multipurpose ships able to be used in a wide range of operations. The 
modernization plan also included the procurement of a new and modern Integrated Sea 
Surveillance System to increase the Navy’s monitoring capabilities. Both projects were 
financed by the defense budget and cost around $50 million.  
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4.  Albanian Navy-CC MAR Naples Cooperation 
The Navy emerged as the leading agency in the maritime security issues. It 
developed capabilities to ensure maritime situational awareness through promotion of 
regional cooperation, encouraging of interagency cooperation and modernization of 
assets. Due to these efforts it was able to exchange intelligence and reliable information 
with NATO. The Maritime Component Command (CC MAR) of Joint Force Command 
(JFC) Naples played a distinguished role in mentoring and supporting the Navy’s 
transformation. CC MAR Naples through the Accession and Integration Working Group 
(AIWG) activities which include seminars, Mobile Training Teams (MTT), port visits etc 
advised and assisted Albanian Navy to transform according the NATO standards. CC 
MAR Naples introduced Albanian Navy with the Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), 
the ongoing counter terrorism maritime operation in Mediterranean. In 2007, the 
Albanian Navy and the CC MAR Naples signed an Operational Agreement for the 
participation of Albania in the OAE. According to the agreement Albania will share 
maritime information with CC MAR Naples.  
CC MAR Naples assisted Albanian Navy to improve the Maritime Situational 
Awareness. In 2007 CC MAR Naples installed in Albania the first Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) transponder which transmitted via internet to the Operational 
Center in Naples real time data about the ship maritime traffic in Albania. At the same 
time a dedicated secure line was established to share sensitive information. The 
commitment to share maritime information with NATO gave a big impetus to the 
interagency cooperation. The navy led a dynamic campaign to promote interagency 
cooperation which was consolidated in the coming years. 
5.  Participating in Regional Initiatives in the Context of Euro-Atlantic 
 Integration 
Regional cooperation and initiatives were another way that NATO promoted the 
security of the region. Albania participated in a great number of bilateral and regional 
cooperation initiatives and agreements focused on enhancing security. Two regional 
initiatives were particularly important in fostering regional cooperation as part of the 
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process of Euro-Atlantic integration: US-Adriatic Charter-3 (A3) and South Eastern 
Defense Ministerial. Adriatic Charter-3 was signed in 2003 by Albania, Croatia, 
Macedonia and the United States. The charter, facilitated by the United States, aimed to 
increase the cooperation among the three NATO aspirant countries in order to coordinate 
their efforts toward Euro-Atlantic integration. The high level of cooperation achieved in 
this initiative is evidence of the progress these countries have made in adopting NATO 
methods and procedures of cooperation and political consultation.192  
One of the biggest achievements of the initiative was the contribution to the ISAF 
Operation in 2005 with a rotating joint medical team. Albania contributes to two doctors 
and two nurses to the team. This contribution has a symbolic value because first of all it 
shows the resolve of A3 countries to cooperate under the NATO-integration perspective. 
It also shows that the countries have reached the maturity to overcome regional issues 
and provide humanitarian assistance to distant countries. Finally the joint medical team 
showed that the countries, although their relatively small economies, de facto are able to 
raise capabilities to support NATO operations. The success of the initiative led to its 
enlargement in 2008 with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro.  
6.  Southeastern Europe Defense Ministerial (SEEDM). 
SEEDM was established in 1996 when Defense Ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Turkey and the U.S. Defense Secretary met in Tirana to 
discuss and decide about effective ways for developing cooperation, common 
understanding and mutual confidence in the Southeastern Europe.193 The initiative played 
a considerable role in promoting the Euro-Atlantic integration of NATO non-member 
countries which by cooperating with member countries in the framework of peace and 
security had another way to share experience, interact and show their determination to 
deserve the NATO membership. The initiative was able to develop several projects such 
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as Military Support to WMD Counter-Proliferation, Border Security and Counter 
Terrorism (CBSC) Project.194  
However, the most representative feature of the initiative is the Multinational 
Peace Force Southeastern Europe commonly referring as (SEEBRIG). SEEBRIG’s 
mission is to engage in conflict prevention operations or other operations in support of 
peace under an UN-mandated NATO-EU led missions. SEEBRIG is an infantry brigade 
composed by the forces from the SEDM countries. In 2004 the brigade was certified Full 
Operational Capacity (FOC) by a NATO assessment team and in 2006 was deployed in 
Peace Support Operation in Afghanistan as part of ISAF. The participation in 
Afghanistan is recognized as the greatest success of SEDM. 
 INCREASED EFFORTS IN THE PRE-INVITATION PERIOD E.
The change of the government after the 2005 elections did not change the 
strategic objectives of Albania’s foreign policy. The new government program stated 
firmly: “[T]he integration in the Euro-Atlantic security structures is the primary strategic 
objective of the foreign policy of Albania. This priority is and will remain the priority of 
all governments.”195 
In the Istanbul Summit NATO had welcomed the efforts made by Albania and 
encouraged Albania to do more to carry on reforms, to fight corruption and organized 
crime to provide border security and to respect the rule of law. The new government, 
which came to power with the slogan “Time to change,”196 declared zero tolerance in the 
fight against corruption and organized crime. The Penal Code was amended and 
introduced tougher sanctions for crimes of corruption, organized crime and terrorism. 
Particularly special was the introducing of a three year moratorium which banned the use 
of fast boats in the coast of Albania in order to stop the illegal trafficking. Taking this 
extreme security measure, which obviously infringes the human rights and civil liberties, 
shows that border security was very high in the political agenda. The maritime 
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moratorium encountered some criticism by the opposition party and by representatives of 
the civil society but interestingly enough it was accepted largely by the population, which 
was willing to give up some freedom in order to achieve border security as a prerequisite 
to join the Euro-Atlantic alliance.  
The government supported the Armed Forces Reforms and modernization plans 
keeping the promise to increase the defense budget annually until it reached the objective 
of 2 percent in 2008. The government financed major modernization project such as the 
Integrated Coastal Surveillance System, the four-large patrol boats project, C4I 
equipment, etc. The increasing of defense budget was another critical choice that the 
government had to make in order to prepare the Armed Forces to be interoperable with 
NATO. 
The pre-invitation period was characterized by an intensification of NATO-
Albania political and military relations. In 2006, Secretary General Scheffer visited 
Tirana. In his speech in the parliament he appreciated the reforms and stated that the 
allies saw the “seriousness and determination with which Albania is pursuing the 
necessary reforms in a very favorable light.”197 He ensured the members of parliament 
that Albania’s integration was no longer a question of “if” but “when.”198 
In 2006, Prime Minister Sali Berisha visited Brussels to discuss Albania’s 
progress at the end of the eighth cycle of MAP. The Council of Ambassadors lauded 
Albania for its defense reforms and the strict measures against corruption, organized 
crime and illegal trafficking. Albania was also commended for its foreign policy, its role 
as a moderator in the security and stability of the region and its contribution in the fight 
against international terrorism. Prime Minister Berisha renewed the steadfast 
determination of the government to achieve NATO integration and told that an ad hoc 
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NATO integration parliamentary committee was established in order to facilitate the 
process.199  
In 2007 Albania enhanced its contribution to ISAF with a company from the 
Rapid Reaction Brigade with 112 military personnel. At the end of 2007 Albanian Armed 
Forces engaged in international PSO in one single rotation reached 355 personnel or 
almost 6 percent of all operational land forces. This measure demonstrated that Albania 
was keeping its promise to become a security provider.  
1.  NATO-Albania Military Relations intensified  
In the period 2005–2007, Albania hosted three major NATO-PfP exercises. In 
2005, Albania hosted the Exercise “Cooperative Engagement,” the biggest ever 
conducted in the region, with the participation of 1500 military personnel, more than 20 
ships and four helicopters from NATO and partner countries, which trained together in 
Crisis Response Operations.200 The exercise tested also Albania’s host nation capabilities 
and the public reaction to such a large NATO military presence in the country. The 
maritime exercise drew a lot of attention of the local population who visited the ships and 
participated in CIMIC activities. Amid this public enthusiasm the exercise seemed to be 
more than a simple political and military event.201 
In 2007, Albania hosted two exercises in the framework of the PfP called 
Cooperative Longbow 07 and Cooperative Lancer 07. Approximately 1,100 military 
personnel from seven NATO countries and 13 partner nations participated in the exercise. 
The objective of these exercises was to promote interoperability between NATO and 
Partner forces when conducting a complex and dynamic crises response operation.202  
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In 2007, the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) conducted a port visit 
in Durres, Albania. Prime Minister Berisha noted the presence of the NATO ships in the 
port of Durres as another sign of excellent relations that Albania has established and is 
being consolidating more and more with NATO.203  The ships drew a lot of attention 
from the local people, who waited in long lines to visit the ships. The SNMG2 conducted 
many CIMIC activities including charity works and sport activities in order to establish 
close relations with the local community. 
  CONCLUSION F.
NATO-Albania relation intensified after Albania joined MAP. MAP proved to be 
a handy tool to guide and check Albania’s plans and efforts in the integration process. 
The security documents that were adopted were developed under the supervision of 
NATO and were based completely on NATO’s strategic concept. These documents made 
a realistic assessment of the security environment and chose the Euro-Atlantic integration 
and regional cooperation as the best way to achieve peace and stability in the region. The 
post-September 11 events marked a closer cooperation between NATO and Albania. 
Albania successfully adapted to the new security environment and to changes that NATO 
itself was undergoing. Albania did not hesitate to embark on the fight against 
international terrorism showing the alliance that it was ready to contribute to the 
collective security. Albania used political consultation with NATO and embarked on 
deep reforms in order to improve the internal security, fight organized crime, illegal 
trafficking. It made good use of NATO advice and assistance to dispose the large amount 
of ammunitions inherited from the old regime denying the criminals and the terrorist to 
get them. The military reforms transformed the military in a modern professional one 
focused on joint concept and interoperability with NATO. The military adapted 
successfully to the new missions and developed capabilities to conduct operations against 
terrorism and crises response operations.  
                                                 




Regional Euro-Atlantic prospective provided the incentive to regional cooperation 
to foster mutual confidence and understanding. The biggest success of these initiatives 
was developing joint capabilities to deploy in NATO led crises response operations. The 
public and political support to the integration process has been unsheltered. This explains 
some extreme measures taken to improve border control in the face of human rights, such 
as the maritime moratorium. In the view of the fight against terrorism NATO-Albania 
relations helped improve the internal security through consultation, advice, technical 
assistance and planning. The soft power of the Alliance and the democratic values it 
represents influenced the public to identify terrorism as national threat and condemn it. It 
is interesting the fact that in a study conducted in 2008 terrorism was listed second major 
threat to the security in a country which never experienced serious terrorist acts.204  The 
emphasis that the government and the West put on the fight against international 
terrorism might be a reasonable explanation for this though. All these listed above denied 
terrorists to use Albania as a safe heaven. On the other hand, Albania was able to 
contribute to the alliance modest but symbolically important military contingents 
showing understanding of the alliance spirit and collective security concept.  
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IV. ALBANIA IN NATO 
Secretary General Scheffer, in his speech at the Albanian Parliament in 2006, 
stated that “NATO enlargement was a performance-based process.”205 But he also 
clarified that once Albania had done what was expected from it, NATO would keep its 
own part of the deal, opening its doors.206 Scheffer with these words actually gave a clear 
positive message for Albania that joining NATO for Albania “was no longer a question 
of ‘if’ but of ‘when.’”207  
In the event, Albania received the invitation to join NATO at the Bucharest 
Summit in 2008, thereby realizing one of its two major foreign policy goals. (The other, 
as yet in progress, is joining the EU.) The accession protocol was signed in July 2008. 
After the ratification of the accession protocol by the parliaments of each member state, 
in 2009, Albania was warmly welcomed as member, together with Croatia, at the 
Kehl/Strasbourg NATO summit.208  
The NATO invitation was a major historical event for Albania. The euphoric 
words of the Albanian PM Sali Berisha at the Bucharest summit—“This is a miracle of 
freedom” —indeed convey the enthusiasm of the people of a country that, less than two 
decades earlier under a ruthless communist regime, had used all of its resources to defend 
itself against NATO, at least as the old leadership had understood the organization.  
Certainly the Alliance put a lot of trust in inviting Albania to join the Alliance, which is 
in fact, one of the qualities of the Alliance. Berisha, remarked on this trust, and called it 
the “great responsibility of my nation toward your nations.” Berisha solemnly vowed “to 
carry out every reform, adopt and implement any decision and law to reach and 
                                                 
205 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “Speech by Secretary General,” (Speech held at the Albanian Parliament, 
Tirana, Albania, July 6, 2006), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060706a.htm. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Elmaz Leci, “Albania in NATO from strategy to reality,” 
http://www.albatlanta.com/webpub/publications/viewpub.asp?ID=1436. 
 72 
consolidate the political, social, economic and military standards of NATO member 
states.”209 In reality that was what both NATO and the people of Albania wanted to hear. 
Several studies agree that joining NATO provides incentive for some countries to 
speed up reforms and achieve integration objectives. However, there is a general belief 
that once the country enters the Alliance and the “carrot” disappears, the commitment to 
reform dwindles, as well. Albania showed a strong commitment to fulfill membership 
conditions. The path was difficult because Albania had to embark on significant reforms 
in several sectors to consolidate democracy and revamp the defense sector. An important 
achievement was the establishment of a positive image of Albania as a security factor in 
the troubled region of Balkans and in the fight against terrorism. More importantly, 
Albania retained its high level of motivation where NATO-related reform is concern, and 
the process of modernization, westernization, democratization, and integration continues 
apace. As Scheffer noted, although there was still a lot of work to do in many areas, 
Albania’s sustained and earnest determination to act in the spirit of Alliance was seen in a 
very favorable light by the allies.210 This chapter explores this final stage of Albania’s 
journey to NATO—which also may be understood as the phase of complete Euro-
Atlantic integration and democratic consolidation.  It looks at the real costs and benefits 
of membership for Albania, as well as the trends and developments that may continue—
and those that may change—in the years to come. 
       COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS A.
Interestingly, no comprehensive cost-benefit analysis was done until Albania 
received the NATO invitation. Even then, the analysis was kept at the academic and 
expert level and was not explained to the public. A survey carried out by an IDM team 
from March to May 2007 and sponsored by NATO identified a “NATO-friendly 
Albanian audience which [was] quite optimistic about the process of NATO integration 
in the country.” However, the survey suggested that the public was not well informed on 
NATO integration process:  
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Yet, high levels of “DON’T KNOW” answers and other inconsistencies 
particularly with regard to factors influencing security matters or 
consequences deriving from the NATO integration process lead to the 
conclusion that respondents often offer their support to “what’s necessary” 
for membership without giving too much thought to technicalities of the 
process.211  
The same issue was raised at the Regional Conference the Costs and Benefits of 
NATO Membership held in Tirana in May 2008. At the conference, it was pointed out 
that the expected NATO membership of Albania and other countries of the Adriatic 
Charter was taking place in a process not very well understood not only by the public but 
also by such important actors as the private sector, academia, and the media.  
In Albania, the public discourse focused more on the positive sides of the 
membership. The politicians very seldom mentioned the costs of the membership, while 
the media focused on political issues and other concerns related to efforts in the 
framework of NATO integration. There might be two reasons for this tendentious 
coverage. First, there was massive public support and enthusiasm to join NATO—so 
much so that, in reality, there was little room for a detailed discussion of the costs and 
benefits of NATO membership. For the majority of the Albanian people NATO 
membership meant joining the West, and the obvious, if ill-defined, benefits clearly 
outran any costs. Second, because joining NATO was so popular, politicians did not want 
to risk losing favor by digging into the costs of it. Not surprisingly, the government’s 
slogan at that time was “membership at any cost.”  The result was a curiously uninformed 
public discourse at all levels.  For example, while the public fully supported Albania’s 
membership in NATO, a vocal segment of the population opposed the 2 percent of GDP 
level for the defense budget that NATO membership presupposed. 212   
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1.      The Costs of NATO Membership 
It is possible to identify two categories of costs associated with NATO 
membership: defense-related direct costs and indirect non-military costs. 
Defense-related direct costs are those that are related directly with the accession 
of Albania to the Alliance, including the cost of defense reforms needed to provide the 
contribution of Albania in the collective defense and other NATO missions and 
operations.213 These costs include:214  
• The membership cost. This is the country’s financial contribution that goes to the 
common budget of the Alliance. For Albania, it is estimated to represent 0.05 
percent to 0.1 percent of the NATO budget—about $2.5 million. 
• The cost of maintaining the defense budget: The member country is expected to 
maintain a defense budget equal to 2 percent of its GDP. This rate is needed to 
develop defense capabilities to defend the country and capabilities to contribute to 
NATO missions. The defense budget is important to sustain the modernization of 
the armed force according to the NATO standards. 
• The cost of participating in NATO operations. This category includes the cost of 
equipping training, deploying, providing logistics, establishing command and 
control for the troops participating in NATO operations. Until present Albania 
covered only 20 percent of this cost while the remaining amount was covered by 
ally countries. Albania is expected to cover 100 percent of this cost as NATO 
member.  
• The cost of the civilian and military representation in NATO HQs and other 
structures. There are around 40 positions for military and around the same number 
of positions to be filled by civilians. Their salaries and other expenses relating to 
their job are covered by the country.  
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• The cost of participating in NATO activities such as NATO exercises, seminars, 
workshops and trainings that are required to achieve the interoperability with the 
Allies. The cost of participation in these activities before the membership has 
been covered by the Alliance. 
• The cost of development of infrastructure in order to fulfill the requirements of 
the host nation. The member state is required to offer its infrastructure to be used 
by NATO if needed. This infrastructure should meet the standards of the Alliance. 
These direct military costs are a burden on the economy of the country. Let’s not 
forget that although the economic development of the recent years Albania remains one 
of the poorest countries of Europe with the lowest GDP per capita. The money of the 
taxpayers that might be needed for building hospitals, schools, or improve the economy is 
going to defense. This is even harder to explain in the absence of an immediate external 
threat to the national security. About 90 percent of the participants in a survey think that 
the external threat to Albania is very low.215 Some of them think that we don’t need to 
spend much on defense because we are protected by NATO. This is the public should be 
informed on the requirements that should be meet, the cost and the benefits of the NATO 
membership. 
In addition to defense related costs that are easier to calculate there is another 
category of costs, namely indirect-nonmilitary costs. These costs are hard to evaluate 
because they implicate political and social aspects. 
• The NATO membership limits the sovereignty of the member country and 
making it subject of collective defense decisions is a political cost.  
• Another political cost might be the loss of public support due to participation of 
troops in NATO PSO, or other operations. In case of casualties the public 
pressure on the government is expected to increase.  
• A political cost might be also the likelihood of targeting Albania because of her 
support to NATO missions. For example, the support of Albania to the fight 
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against terrorism is well known internationally. This might turn it into a target for 
the terrorists trying to force the people to stop the public support to government’s 
anti-terrorism policies.   
• The NATO membership will require the implantation of many reforms and 
measures to ensure the implementation of law, tax collection, customs control, 
and border control. Tough measures are taken to fight corruption organized crime. 
All of these measures are associated with considerable costs. 
• The abolition of the informal economy the short term will have social 
implications to the small businessmen who make their living based on the 
informal economy.  
• The defense reforms aim to create small professional armed forces. This means 
that many military personnel have to leave the military. This fact has negative 
implications on social security schemes and on the integration of these middle 
aged ex-military personnel. 
Many observers think that the cost of membership in terms of financial expenditures 
is not an extra cost to the budget of the country because that cost, or even greater, 
would have been spent anyway for the defense of the country.216 Saying that, national 
security experts put forward that taking into consideration the poor economy, the 
limited resources of the country, the backward military technology, the regional 
instability and the nature of the 21st century threats it would have been very hard to 
protect the national interest. 
2.       The Benefits of NATO Membership 
The benefits of NATO membership encompass a wide range of fields from 
defense and security sectors to economic factors. For one example, Albanian national 
interest is related to the protection of the rights of ethnic Albanians living in five different 
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countries in Balkans: Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. The ethnic 
conflicts of Kosovo and Macedonia involving ethnic Albanians thus posed a substantial 
threat to the Albanian national interest. NATO’s intervention in both cases kept Albania 
out of involving itself directly in a bloody, endless regional war, for which the Balkans 
had won a bad reputation. It is true that Albania, today, does not recognize an external 
threat to its national interest but this happy fact is partly thanks to the stability that Euro-
Atlantic perspective has brought to the region. That is, NATO membership brings 
stability to the region and serves the national interest. 
NATO has guided and continues to assist Albania throughout the reform of its 
security sector in order to achieve full integration. Through the strategic concept and 
other NATO strategic documents, Albania can identify such new threats to its security as 
terrorism, and fight against them collectively with the Allies. Civilian control of the 
military ensures the development of the fragile democracy, even in times of acute 
domestic unrest. The armed forces’ transformation, modernization, and training with the 
Allies continue, making them able to face the threats and challenges of our time.  
In addition, being part of the most powerful security organization based on 
democracy and the respect for human rights improves the image of the country. It 
guarantees to neighboring countries that Albania is a stable democracy able to cooperate 
to improve the security in the region. In economic terms, it guarantees foreign investors 
can make safe investments in the economy of Albania.217 It also attracts more tourists 
who are eager to visit a country that is rich in natural, historical, and archeological 
attractions but that is also safe.  
The rosy glow of NATO membership radiates beyond Albania’s border in terms 
of a positive image of the state and its government as an international partner. Albania, 
after membership, has a stronger voice in the realm of international relations. Albania has 
been invited to join countless regional and international security, economic, and cultural, 
initiatives and agreements, increasing its cooperation with the international community. 
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A good indicator of the improvement of the international positions of Albania is its 
successful lobbying for the international recognition of independence of Kosovo. At 
present Kosovo’s independence is recognized by 94 states, of which 22 are EU members, 
while 24 are NATO countries.218  
Additionally NATO membership provides solid support to the relatively new 
democracy of Albania by urging it to complete the legal reforms to establish a full 
consolidated democracy. By submitting part of the national sovereignty to the Alliance of 
Democracies in fact Albanians receive some kind of warranty that the ruling political 
parties will take all measures needed for the process of democratization.219 Furthermore, 
NATO membership is seen as an important and indispensable step before achieving the 
other major objective of the government: joining the EU. Most of the reforms required by 
NATO are also conditions set by the EU. With NATO membership, the chances of 
Albania to join the EU are doubled. 
Finally there is a moral benefit for Albania as well. As, Deputy Minister of 
Defense, Arian Starova, put it:  
…it is the special consideration all the Albanians have with regard to the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo in the year 1999 to give an end to the 
genocide atrocities of the Milosevic’s regime against the Albanians there 
[and] being conscious of their historic sufferings Albanians in turn want to 
play their gratifying role for the freedom and security of the other 
peoples… 220 
This quote complements the explanation of wide support for Albanian 
contribution to NATO PSO—but makes the Albanian reluctance to publicize the points in 
cost-benefit terms even more mystifying.  In the end, a cost-benefit analysis not only 
would have underscored even more the importance of the membership, but also would 
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have helped Albanians understand the process better, laying the groundwork to achieve 
the standards more easily.    
 ALBANIA KEEPS ITS PROMISES TO NATO B.
One of the concerns of the Alliance about enlargement is that new members tend 
not to keep the same level of commitment and contribution after they “graduate” from 
candidacy to full membership. This was the case with the seven countries that joined 
NATO in 2005. In contrast, Albania pressed on with its NATO involvement, increased 
the range of engagements in NATO operations and increased the quantity and the quality 
of its contribution according to the Alliance principle of “burden-sharing.” This 
perseverance justified Albania’s listing among the five members that set an example in 
fulfilling their membership obligations.221   
1.        Enhancing Contribution to ISAF  
Almost one year into its NATO membership, Albania sent to Herat, under Italian 
command, another company composed of 110 personnel from its elite army Commando 
Regiment (RRB). With this enhancement, the number of Albanian military personnel 
engaged in mission in Herat in one single rotation reached 220 while the total number of 
servicemen engaged in Herat since 2007 over passes 1700.222 
In August 2010, Albania contributed for the first time to ISAF with a contingent 
of 45 members of Special Forces Battalion of the Army. The contingent, named “Eagle,” 
served as part of the U.S. Army 525th Brigade and participated in direct combat 
operations in Kandahar. This mission was a considerable political risk taken by the 
Albanian government. The fact that, until then, there were no casualties for Albanian 
personnel participating in PSOs owed mostly to the nature of the missions, which were 
not very exposed to combat operations. Moreover, this engagement in direct combat 
missions in Afghanistan might have backfired on Albania in terms of hostility by Islamic 
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extremists to Albanian troops in Afghanistan or to Albania more generally. (Albanian 
soldiers had won a good reputation in Iraq and Afghanistan not only due to their common 
culture and religious values but also because of their nature of their non-combat-
engagement there.) In this context, this decision of the Albanian government was a real 
courageous one.  
“Eagle 1” was a real military and political success. Albanian personnel were 
praised by their allied counterparts for their professionalism and bravery.223 The 
Albanian Army showed that it was able to conduct substantially much more difficult 
missions reliably. At the same time, Albania demonstrated that it was able to take 
political risk and respect its collective security obligations. The “Eagle” missions 
continue in six-month rotations. More than 150 elite military personnel served in “Eagle” 
missions in Kandahar.  
In August 2011, Albania increased its contribution to the ISAF mission; with 20 
military personnel in the Operational Mentoring Liaison Team (OMLT) deployed to 
Kabul.224 The mission of this OMLT is to train, support, and develop a Support 
Combating Battalion of the Afghan National Army (ANA) capable of a wide spectrum of 
operations at the battalion level. To date, more than 50 Albanian military personnel are 
engaged in OMLT joined teams. In addition, Albania provided representatives in several 
missions related to ISAF, such as the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, the 
Provincial Reconstruction Team, ISAF HQs, A-5 POMLT under the A-5 Charter, and so 
on.  
Albania is one of the largest troop contributors to ISAF as a percentage of 
population and GDP. Since July 2003, more than 2600 military personnel have been 
engaged in ISAF operation.225 This sum equals about 20 percent of the total number of 
the armed forces. In addition to its military contribution, Albania at the Bratislava NATO 
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Ministerial, held in October 2009, committed itself to provide non-military assistance to 
Afghanistan, as well. These measures included providing trainers to assist the 
development of the Afghan military and police force, sending a medical team to assist the 
civilian population, reconstructing or building eight schools in poor regions of 
Afghanistan, and providing 100 scholarships to Afghan students who would like to study 
at Albanian universities.226 
This non-military assistance to Afghanistan drew international attention, 
particularly the measures to improve education in Afghanistan. The Deutche Welle asked 
Minister of Defense, Arben Imami, to explain the decision to finance education in 
Afghanistan while is well known that Albania needs to improve its own education 
infrastructure, too.227 Minister Imami explained that, first of all, Albania as a NATO 
member had some obligations to fulfill.228  
2.        Maintaining a Stable Defense Budget 
Albania also kept its defense budget at a steady 1.5 percent of GDP. This 
commitment was a difficult one in light of the global economic crises. In 2011, only two 
NATO members passed the 2-percent NATO objective, while 17 countries were below 
1.5 percent, showing a decreasing trend in the last years.229 The Albanian Armed Forces 
continued such modernization projects as building three additional “Iliria”-class patrol 
boats and the procurement of five multi-role “Cougar” helicopters from Eurocopter—
both significant outlays in a time of financial pressure from all sides. Moreover, the 
project of building a self-sustainable battle-group battalion, able to participate in NATO 
mission by 2014, proceeds according the plan.  
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3.         Passing the “Casualty” Test 
 “NATO commanders have found it increasingly difficult to persuade members to 
stay in Afghanistan in the face of mounting death tolls and domestic opposition.”230  For 
example, France ended its combat mission in Afghanistan earlier than planned after a 
series of killings of French soldiers.231 Italy, Slovenia, and Poland also withdrew their 
troops amid domestic pressure after the death toll among their soldiers rose.    
 Albanian military personnel had suffered no casualties in 16 years232 of 
engagement in PSOs. The limited exposure to combat operations partly accounts for that. 
This luck did not hold for Albania’s involvement in Afghanistan. In February 2012, 
Albanian Captain Feti Vogli was shot dead and Corporal Aleksander Peci was severely 
wounded after an Afghan policeman treacherously opened fire on them. They were part 
of the “Eagle 4” contingent and that day they were on a reconnaissance mission together 
with their American counterparts in Spin Boldak, Kandahar. Their mission was to 
provide protection to intelligence officers who talking with locals about how to open a 
school and a medical center in a village.233 
 The news of the death of the Special Forces captain shocked the whole county and 
received unprecedented media coverage. Captain Vogli was honored with the highest 
medal, the “Martyr of the Nation.” The whole population of Albania united to pay 
homage to him. The highest state representatives, the President of the Republic, Prime 
Minister, Speaker of the Parliament, Ministers, political party leaders, ambassadors, 
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representatives of religious communities thousands of military personnel and citizens 
paid tribute and bowed before of the lifeless body of Captain Vogli.234  
Prime Minister Berisha declared solemnly that “his soul [would] rest on the altar 
of liberty of both the Albanian and Afghan nations for which he sacrificed his life.”235  
Chief of General Staff Major General Xhemal Gjunkshi praised Vogli for serving with 
bravery and fortitude and honoring his flag and nation.236 The Minister of Defense, 
Arben Imami, said that “the heroic act of Captain Feti Vogli, makes the Armed Forces 
personnel feel proud before the people and Nation.”237 Opposition leader Edi Rama also 
expressed gratitude for his highest patriotic service.238 He saw the ultimate sacrifice of 
Captain Vogli as “an invaluable contribution of the small Albania for the big democratic 
world.”239 
This positive—and unified—political and public reaction to the first loss of life of 
military personnel in a PSO operation is closely related to at least two factors. First, there 
is a strong belief that the participation of Albanian troops in ISAF serves the right cause 
of the free world in the fight against the terrorism. Second, thousands of years of 
Albanian history pay great tribute and honors to those who bravely fall in the line of duty, 
fighting for a just cause.   
Prime Minister Berisha, in a phone call with General John Allen, Commander of 
ISAF, assured the American commander that the Albanian Armed Forces and the 
Albanian government continue to believe strongly that ISAF troop will fulfill 
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successfully its historical mission; more importantly, he declared that Albania is 
dedicated to continue its contribution to this mission.240 In the same vein, General 
Xhemal Gjunkshi, in a phone call with General Martin Dempsey, U.S. Military Chairman 
of Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that “the heroic fall of Captain Vogli did not shake the 
determination of Albania to participate in PSO operations [alongside] the U.S. allies.”241 
At the NATO Chicago Summit, held in May 2012, Prime Minister Berisha repeated 
Albania’s commitment to keep its troops in Afghanistan as long as NATO was there—if 
necessary even beyond 2014.”  
4.       Consultation with NATO, Warranty for Democracy  
The helpful and well-tried practice of consultation with NATO on sensitive issues 
continued even after Albania acceded to full membership. It is understandable that 
member countries should consult each other on daily basis on various issues. However, 
two issues—and the public attention that the Albanian- NATO consultations received—
suggest that in this case, consultation has an added value. 
In 2010, the Albanian government prepared a draft amendment for the Law on the 
Intelligence Service. Broadly stated, the general reason for the amendment was to 
increase the efficiency of the Intelligence Service by giving more control to the 
government. The draft amendment generated a heated political debate in Albania, which 
tends to take a dim view of the Intelligence Service, as is the case in all ex-communist 
countries. Giving more control over it to the Prime Minister was viewed very skeptically 
by a public wary of a political police force. Not only the opposition party, but also 
government coalition parties refused to vote on the law without first consulting with 
NATO on the draft amendment.242 The draft amendment was suspended. Since then, 
NATO’s answer or comments to the draft have not been made public, but NATO 
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Secretary General Rasmussen, during his visit to Albania in 2010, acknowledged that he 
had had a phone conversation with PM Berisha on this issue and that he was “very 
confident that the Albanian government will ensure that all Albanian laws will be 
conform NATO standards.”243 Ultimately, the government withdrew the draft law. 
In 2012, the opposition party accused the Ministry of Defense of a lack of 
transparency on weapons trade and the management of military real estate inventory. A 
group of members of parliament from the opposition party requested parliamentary 
oversight on the Ministry of Defense. The parliamentary audit team, composed of 
opposition members of parliament, was not allowed to conduct the inspection of the 
Minister of Defense on grounds of illegality and political accusation. Then, a group of 
parliament members wrote a letter to SG Rasmussen notifying him about the situation 
and asking his mediation to unblock this institutional deadlock.244 SG Rasmussen replied 
with a letter to the Albanian parliamentarians stating that he appreciated the role of 
Albania in NATO and specifying that the parliamentary oversight is crucial for the 
country’s democracy. He wisely advised that it was in “the best of the country that 
national institutions cooperate closely and constructively.”245 
 On one hand these events illustrate the mutual distrust in the national institutions 
and in opposite political parties in a non-consolidated democracy. On the other hand, it 
shows that there is a strong confidence in NATO, which is seen as a guarantor of the 
democracy in Albania.   
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 THE WAY AHEAD C.
The aftermath of NATO membership will pose its own challenges for Albania. 
After membership in the Alliance comes the integration into the Alliance. This 
integration is a longer process related to “the development of political, economic, 
financial and military capabilities of the member to be able to exercise both the benefits 
and the contributions of collective security and defense.”246  
1.      The Integration Begins 
In this context, the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) began full military integration 
in NATO structure. Allied Command of Transformation (ACT) is guiding this very 
important process. In close cooperation with ACT, a midterm integration plan has been 
developed. The plan prioritizes the review of Strategic Documents and the Long Term 
Military Plan, the management of Human Resources, the Force Goals (FG), Logistics and 
Collective Defense. For each field working groups are established and cooperating 
closely with allied experts to develop plans. 
A Strategic Defense Review (SDR) is currently in process. The recommendation 
of the SDR will be the base of the NSS and Military Strategy which are also under 
review.247 These strategic documents will reflect the new status of Albania, as a NATO 
member, depict the path to the full integration of AAF in NATO structures, and include 
NATO’s new Strategic Concept. “The new forms of terrorism, cybercrime, energy 
security, proliferation of WMD, ballistic missiles, piracy, failed states, natural disasters 
etc. are some of the actual threats and challenges which are pointed out in NATO’s 
Lisbon Strategic Concept.248 These threats will be also part of the NSS of Albania.”249 
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The SDR will support the concept of security sector reform, which defines the Armed 
Forces and the other security instruments of the security sector as public services in 
support of the community.250 
 In 2008 Albania accepted 49 Force Goals, which aim to increase the operational 
capabilities of the AAF until 2018. During this period, Albania will undertake seriously 
to build military and civilian capabilities capable to participate not only in NATO 
Article 5 operations, but also in other NATO operations, such as PSO. Different from the 
Partnership Goals, where implementation was voluntary and the partner country was 
evaluated based on its political ambition, the implementation of Force Goals is 
mandatory, and the NATO member is held accountable in front of other members for not 
fulfilling them. Thus, the planning and the implementation of this package of Force Goals 
will be the priority of MoD for the next years.251 
The Alliance’s 2010 Strategic Concept establishes NATO’s strategic priorities 
and its vision of Euro-Atlantic security for the next years. It provides an analysis of the 
strategic environment and identifies the kinds of operations NATO must be able to 
conduct.252 In this context, the next missions of the AAF, as a NATO member, are 
expected to be more difficult, longer, more complex, multinational, and in distant 
locations. The AAF will have to be trained, well equipped and deployable able to 
participate in NATO missions wherever is required. The AAF’s aim is to self-sustain its 
deployable forces for a long period. This effort will be not only costly but also will 
require a substantial change in the training and the doctrine of use of AAF. In this process 
the modernization of the AAF becomes indispensable.253 
The development of these capabilities will be hard to fund in the defense budget. 
Even developed NATO members are facing difficulties in developing capabilities in 
order to keep pace with NATO’s transformation. Albania, with the smallest GDP of all, 
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has a more difficult job to do. It needs to reach the NATO standards while keeping the 
pace with its change. The government should keep the defense budget near 2 percent in 
order to continue the modernization projects. The modernization of the Albanian Armed 
Forces is expected to continue in order to ensure meeting the requirement of the 
integration and interoperability with the Alliance.  
2.       Developing Niche Capabilities, Single Set of Forces and Smart Defense  
Albania is considering the development of “niche capabilities.” These are 
qualitative capabilities in a specific field. Albania is considering developing such 
capabilities at the company level s Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD), Military Police, 
HUMINT, CIMIC, Boarding Teams, etc. Taking into consideration that 70 percent of 
Albania’s terrain is mountainous, developing mountainous army units may be another 
option.254 On the one hand, such capabilities can be supported by the defense budget. On 
the other hand, these capabilities would be more helpful in support of NATO operations 
as they are specialized qualitative capabilities in special area. 
Albania has showed a strong commitment to participate in NATO’s PSO 
operations. In addition, Albania participates with troops in several EU or UN PSO 
operations as well. Taking into consideration the aspiration of Albania to join the EU and 
the ambition to be a security provider in the region and in the world, this commitment of 
Albania to contribute in PSO is expected to continue in the future, too. Unfortunately, 
Albania cannot afford to have separate capabilities for national missions and for NATO, 
EU and UN missions. The current SDR is elaborating the concept of “single set of 
forces” in order to develop forces with military and civilian capabilities able to carry out 
national and international operations.255  
The development of new capabilities requires a careful planning and spending. In 
difficult economic times it is very difficult to spend more for the defense, but at the same 
time it is crucial to maintain the capabilities in order to implement the strategic concept. 
“Smart defense” was one of the main issues on the agenda of the Alliance summit on 20–
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21 May 2012, in Chicago. The concept aims to improve allied defense capabilities 
through smarter spending, prioritization and improved cooperation.256 
 Albania fully supported the “Smart Defense” Concept. In this framework Albania 
promoted the regional cooperation through the regional initiatives such as A-5, SEEDM, 
etc. The Minister of Defense Arben Imami in his speech at the “Smart Defense 
Conference: Regional Cooperation among Southeastern Europe Country,” held in Tirana 
in 2012, said that it was crucial to establish a long term and consolidated among the 
regional armed forces aiming the direct contribution to NATO or EU operations.” 257 The 
AAFs have selected 22 projects and they are ready to cooperate on common procurement 
with the other regional countries in the framework of A-5. 
3.      The Fight against Terrorism after NATO Membership 
The fight against terrorism provides Albania with the opportunity to contribute to 
the protection of democratic values aligned with its Allies. Albania is expected to remain 
committed to the fight against international terrorism. This commitment means that with 
NATO integration, Albanian military units will engage in more and more in combat 
missions. This will have two main implications. First, the risk of these troops will 
increase, and second, these operations may outrage the Islamic extremists, who would not 
tolerate a majority Muslim country to fight against them allied with the West. To counter 
these eventualities, Albania should take every measure to ensure the security of its troops 
in the area of operations. It should be careful in choosing the nature of missions that it 
will carry out in accordance with the real capabilities and equipment at disposal. 
Measures should be taken also to develop civilian and critical infrastructure protection.  
Albania has continued to improve the legal framework to discourage the terrorist 
activities in the country. In 2009 Albania adopted the “Law on Preventing the Money 
Laundering and Financing of Terrorism,” which aims to restrict the use of money from 
unlawful activities and to stop the finance of terrorism. The law has been assessed to be 
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in conformity with international standards.258 “The law provides for the coordination 
among all state institutions, bank sector, insurance companies, gambling or games entities 
of casinos or private companies, etc. that deal with money transactions, the movable and 
immovable assets in the territory of Albania, carried to this territory or only in transit”259 
In 2009, the government approved Normative Acts related to suppressing terrorist 
activities such as the Normative Act on the “Investigation of Financial Crime,” “the 
Action Plan to Cross-Cutting Strategy to Fight against Organized Crime, Trafficking, and 
Terrorism.” The same year the parliament approved the law on “Prevention and 
Suppression of Organized Crime, Trafficking through Preventive Measures against 
Property,” which aims “to suppress organized crime and trafficking through confiscation 
of property of persons who have unjustified economic level as a result of suspected 
criminal activities.”260 
Despite this clear progress in the counter terrorism legal measures, a U.S. 
Department of State Report on Terrorism suggests that these efforts were “undermined by 
lack of a data-processing infrastructure and an inadequate capability to track and manage 
cases properly.”261 In 2008 Albania froze the bank accounts related to money laundering 
and terrorist financing. In 2008 the Hamzeh Abu Rayyan, the administrator of the 
company “Loxhall”262 was charged and tried for hiding funds used to finance 
terrorism.263 The company’s assets were confiscated. However, after several trials and 
appeals, he was found not guilty by the Court of Appeals in 2011.264  
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In 2010, a local imam was arrested in Durrës, accused of “publicly inciting and 
propagating terrorist acts” by allegedly calling for jihad in an online forum.265 The 
Durrës court decided to detain the imam pending trial. The imam was found not guilty by 
the Supreme Court of Albania. In both cases Albania has been accused by human rights 
observers of not respecting the human rights. The Islamic Human Rights felt that at “least 
two articles in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have been 
breached by the Albanian authorities.”266  
Albania, as a member of the Alliance of democratic values, should be very careful 
about respecting the human rights and civil liberties of all citizens and fighting terrorism 
within the rule of law. This is crucial to maintain the religious harmony inside the country 
as well as the positive image of Albania in the international arena and the great public 
support and legitimacy that NATO enjoys in Albania Thus it is very important for 
Albania to develop adequate capabilities to prosecute the future cases with 
professionalism and within the rule of law. 
 CONCLUSION D.
After securing NATO membership, Albania continued the commitment to the 
Alliance. The political and public support of NATO continues to be at the highest level 
although it has been noted that a major part of the people does not really understand what 
specific costs and benefits are associated with NATO membership. NATO continued to 
be a “mediator” in domestic disagreements on security issues setting democratic 
standards. It also motivates and shapes much of Albania’s interactions with its neighbors 
and international partners. This ongoing effect is expected to persist in the foreseeable 
future. 
Both NATO and Albanian public opinion expects Albania to continue to be a 
committed member of the Alliance. The democratic reforms are also expected to continue 
due to also EU accession aspirations. Albania has improved its image in the international 
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domain and it is expected to give its contribution also in diplomacy according to NATO’s 
new strategic concept. NATO’s new strategic concept puts a lot of focus on partnerships. 
It calls for fostering and extending the fields of cooperation with partner countries. 
Albania, being a partner country for two decades, may share its experience and assist 
other partner countries on the integration process especially of the countries of the region. 
Under the “smart defense” concept, it can create regional capabilities for the management 
of the air traffic, strategic transportation or civilian emergencies. These capabilities are 
very useful in the facing the threats of our century including terrorism.  
Albania might be helpful in assisting partner countries to demilitarize their 
excessive stockpiles of ammunitions, denying terrorist to possess them, making 
themselves and the region more secure. The Albanian Armed Forces gained invaluable 
experience after conducting a long and difficult process of demilitarization of the 
ammunition stockpile inherited from the Cold War. 267 
Furthermore, Albania might be of great help in fostering the partnership with the 
Islamic countries in the fight against international terrorism, for example, through the 
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the Mediterranean Dialogue. Being a multi-religious 
country with an Islamic majority and a long history of religious tolerance and a clear 
western orientation, Albania may act as a bridge between Islamic countries and NATO. 
Albanian troops may be engaged in CIMIC activities in the Islamic areas of NATO 
operations and may take advantage of the cultural similarities with locals to facilitate the 
civil-military relations.     
Similarly, it will be of great interest the establishing of good relations with 
Russia. Russia is one of the strongest opponents of Kosovo’s independence. Albania may 
improve the chances to approach to Kosovo issue toward constructive cooperation with 
Russia in the auspices of NATO-Russia relations. Generally speaking, NATO 
partnerships offer a great opportunity for the advancing of the national interests as well. 
The partnerships provide a framework of cooperation, consultation and mutual 
confidence for finding common solution to the security problems.  
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Albanian-NATO relations have been eased especially because of the big public 
support that NATO enjoys in Albania. It is in the best of both Albania and NATO to put 
efforts to maintain this support at the same levels. There are some specific issues that 
might decrease the public support for NATO and hamper the excellent relations on place.   
First NATO, and Albania as a NATO member, should work hard for the Euro-
Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans as a whole. The peace and stability of the 
region can be achieved only under the collective security of NATO, sharing its principles 
and values.  
Second, Albania and NATO should work together to find an accepted solution to 
the Albanian National Interest. Albania must channel her efforts to address its national 
interest under the Euro-Atlantic Umbrella. The independence of Kosovo proved the 
wisdom of this course of action. Failing to address the Albanian issue in the NATO 
framework might drop public support and revive the nationalist movements not only in 
Albania but in the whole region. This is very important in a region where the revival of 
nationalism might be still very easy. Albania should never give up to her role as a 
stability factor in the region. 
Third, Albania and NATO should engage in a comprehensive informative 
campaign to enlighten Albanian people on the real benefits and obligations of NATO 
membership. This would prevent delusion, make the expectations more realistic and 
guarantee a strong public support even for tough decisions because Albania would be 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis examines Albanian-NATO relations from the very first stage, when 
Albania expressed its will to join the Alliance, until the present, with Albania a full 
member of NATO. During this time, Albanian-NATO relations passed through different 
forms of partnerships—including PfP, MAP, PARP, and finally, membership. During all 
these stages, Albanian-NATO relations transformed the strategic culture of Albania and 
enhanced security in Albania and in the region.  
Furthermore, the examination of these relations in the light of the fight against 
terrorism provides a compelling case study that shed light on the ability of the Alliance to 
use these partnerships to engage partner/member countries in the fight against 
international terrorism and other 21st- century security threats. 
       IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALBANIAN ARMED FORCES A.
The analysis of the impact that NATO’s counterterrorism strategy has had on the 
transformation of the Albanian Armed Forces provides an interesting case study of the 
process of transforming a nation’s strategic culture through consequent and consistent 
institutional association. The Albanian Armed Forces were transformed dramatically 
from a massive “army of people” into a much smaller, professional, and modern armed 
force, able to adapt to the new security environment, fight successfully against the new 
security threats such as international terrorism and contribute in the international security 
under the Euro-Atlantic Alliance. Participating in the ISAF mission was an invaluable 
experience for the armed forces, which helped them integrate much faster with the allied 
military forces. 
 THE FUTURE OF ALBANIA’S COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNERSHIP B.
WITH AND IN NATO  
Both NATO and Albanian public opinion expects Albania to continue to be a 
committed member of the Alliance. Albania, being a partner country for two decades, is 
ready to play its role in fostering and extending the cooperation with partner countries in 
the fight against international terrorism. Under the “smart defense” concept, it might 
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create regional capabilities for the management of the consequences of terrorist acts, 
surveillance systems, boarding teams, border control, etc. Albania might be helpful in 
assisting partner countries to demilitarize their excessive stockpiles of ammunitions, 
denying terrorist to possess them, making themselves and the region more secure.  
Furthermore, Albania might be of great help in fostering the partnership with the 
Islamic countries in the fight against international terrorism. Being a multi-religious 
country with an Islamic majority and also a long history of religious tolerance and a clear 
western orientation, Albania may act as a bridge between Islamic countries and NATO. 
Albanian troops may be engaged in CIMIC activities in the Islamic areas of NATO 
operations and may take advantage of the cultural similarities with locals to facilitate the 
civil-military relations.     
While there are a lot of benefits for Albania engaging in the fight against the 
international terrorism, one should not forget that there is a cost to be paid, too. Albania 
should be careful to keep the cost as low as possible. Albania should be prudent while 
pursuing strategies against international terrorism that might delegitimize its mission in 
the fight against international terrorism and drop public support. Such strategies should 
not attack Islam as a religion but the Islamic extremism which hampers the religious 
harmony and tolerance that prevails in Albania. Furthermore, all counter terrorism efforts 
should be in accordance with the rule of law, respecting the civil liberties of Albanians as 
it is expected from a NATO country. In addition, Albania should be prepared to face 
terrorist acts that may target Albania or allied troops and interests in Albania as 
retaliation to the contribution in counter international terrorism missions.      
Albanian-NATO relations in the fight against terrorism have been eased 
especially because of the overwhelming public support that NATO enjoys in Albania. It 
is in the best interests of both Albania and NATO to put effort into maintaining this 
support at the same levels. Albania and NATO should work together to find an 
acceptable solution to the Albanian national interest. It includes the recognition of 
Kosovo’s independence by all NATO countries which might open the road of Euro-
Atlantic integration of Kosovo suggesting a stable and acceptable solution of the 
coexistence of, virtually, two Albanian states in the region. In the same view, Albania and 
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NATO should work on respecting the rights of the ethnic Albanians who lives in other 
neighbor countries. Failing to address the Albanian issue in the NATO framework might 
diminish public support and revive the nationalist movements not only in Albania but in 
the whole region which, at the end, influences directly the security of NATO.  
  IMPLICATIONS OF ALBANIAN-NATO RELATIONS FOR ALBANIA C.
Albanian-NATO relations in the fight against terrorism have positive implication 
for both of them. First of all, the fight against terrorism provided Albania with an 
opportunity to convince the West that Albania holds true to the democratic values of the 
Alliance and that it was determined to seek its security within NATO-
partnership/membership. Second, these relations shaped and reinforced the NATO’s 
mindset in Albania to tackle the new security threats. Albania identified the terrorism as a 
security threat to itself and to the world and changed its security documents, doctrine and 
institution in accordance with NATO’s documents in order to be able to fight it. 
Third, Albania’s Euro-Atlantic integration perspective and process provided 
strong incentives to make defense and security institution reforms, fight organize crime, 
illegal trafficking and terrorism financing thus denying Albania to be a safe haven for 
terrorists and improving significantly the domestic security. On the other hand, the 
embrace of NATO’s values and the Albania’s ascription to Euro-Atlantic identity, as 
noted in the thesis, has made it difficult for religious extremists to spread their ideology 
and conduct terrorist activities in Albania.  
Fourth, the fight against international terrorism involves a large spectrum of 
measures and efforts in several fields such as intelligence sharing, border control, 
enacting counter terrorist laws, regional cooperation, developing military capabilities, 
participating in counter terrorism operations and a lot more. Therefore, the contribution 
of a small country in some of these fields might be as valuable as the contribution of a big 
one. This fact created the national awareness of Albania of making important 
contributions in the international fight against terrorism keeping Albania motivated. 
“Having the NATO intervention in Kosovo in the year 1999 to end the genocide 
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atrocities of the Milosevic’s regime against the Albanians there, Albanians, in turn, 
wanted to play their gratifying role for the freedom and security of the other people.”  
Fifth, the fight against international terrorism united Albania with the regional 
countries, increasing cooperation, mutual trust and the awareness to tackle together the 
common threats that endanger the peace and security of the region. In this aspect we may 
say that it fostered the regional security and was a tool of integration in the Euro-Atlantic 
structures. 
 WHAT LESSONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM NATO-ALBANIAN D.
RELATIONS? 
The analysis of the Albanian-NATO relations in the fight against international 
terrorism in this thesis opposes the view that NATO is not the suitable organization to 
fight the international terrorism. The case study showed that NATO partnership 
frameworks with Albania were an effective tool to fight international terrorism for 
several reasons. First, it assisted Albania in improving its internal security, thus reducing 
the risk the country would become a safe haven for terrorists. Second, its engagement in 
the region improved the peace and stability of the Balkans, denying the terrorist activities 
in the region. Third, it promoted Albania’s contribution to the ISAF mission. Fourth, it 
made very good use of soft power by engaging a Muslim majority country in the global 
fight against terrorism, emphasizing the justice of the cause showing that NATO’s 
operations in Afghanistan do not amount to a war on a major world religion but rather a 
war on terrorism in a small band of mass murderers and criminals.  
NATO-Albanian relations in the counterterrorism realm suggest NATO’s ability 
not only to promote constructive cooperation, but also to wage “the war of ideas,” both of 
which are two important fronts in the war on terror.268 The case study is important 
because it demonstrates that the power of the Alliance to fight international terrorism 
rests in the Alliance’s ability to build partnerships and use them effectively. The 
partnership, as the case study showed, may include many fields of cooperation, in 
addition to military cooperation, which all together complement and enhance the efforts 
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in the fight against international terrorism. The Albanian-NATO partnership in the fight 
against terrorism might be a model for the other regional PfP countries that aspire to join 
NATO. NATO should take into consideration the limitation that such a model might 
present due to lower public support and political consensus of other countries to join 
NATO.  
This is why NATO should revitalize the PfP partnership framework269 and adopt 
a “more efficient and flexible partnership policy.”270 NATO should be “open to 
consultation with any partner country on security issues of common concern and offer 
them a substantial role in shaping the NATO-led operations to which they contribute.”271 
The PFP framework should be “better integrated with successful sub-regional initiatives” 
that have similar objectives, for example, the SEDM initiative.272  
Furthermore, PfP and other partnerships should expand to include more 
nonmilitary activities and cooperation, such as police cooperation, intelligence sharing, 
emergency response cooperation, enhancement of law enforcement and training partner 
countries. This is fully in the accordance with the Strategic Concept 2010.   
The Alliance acknowledged the importance of the partnerships in the NATO’s 
strategic concept 2010. The new strategic concept envisages Euro-Atlantic security to be 
“promoted through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and 
organizations around the globe.”273  Albania’s experience with—and continued presence 
in—the Alliance provides a very encouraging basis on which to advance this strategy and 
its manifest benefits. 
                                                 
269 Jeffrey and Simon, “Partnership for Peace: Charting a Course for a New Era,” (National Defense 
University Institute for National Strategic Studies, Fort McNair Washington, March 2004), 35 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-
a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=135944. 
270 “NATO Reform Lite: An Evaluation of the Lisbon Summit (Part I),” NATO Watch, November 26, 
2010, 2, www.natowatch.org/node/432.  
271 Ibid. 
272 Jeffrey and Simon, “Partnership for Peace, 35. 
273 NATO Reform Lite, NATO Watch, 2. 
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